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Optimal Asylum
Shalini Bhargava Ray*

ABSTRACT

The U.S. asylum system is noble but flawed. Scholars have
long recognized that asylum is a "scarce"political resource, but
U.S. law persists in distributing access to asylum based on an
asylum seeker's ability to circumvent migration controls rather
than the strength of the asylum seeker's claim for protection. To
apply for asylum, an asylum seeker must either arrange to be
smuggled into the United States or lie to the consulate while
abroad to obtain a nonimmigrant visa.- Nonimmigrant visa
requirements effectively filter the pool of asylum applicants
according to wealth, educational attainment, and intent not to
remain in the United States indefinitely-criteria completely
unrelated to or at odds with the purposes of refugee law. The
system as currently designed, therefore, selects asylum seekers
based entirely on their ability to satisfy irrelevant criteriaand
without regard to their relative need for protection from
persecution. Such a system fails to maximize the humanitarian
benefits of scarce U.S. asylum resources.
To better protect individuals facing serious persecution,
this Article contends, Congress should consider reforming the
immigration laws to provide for an "asylum visa" to be made
available to certain foreign nationals. U.S. consulates abroad,
under proper and limited circumstances,might issue this visa to
foreign nationals who demonstrate a credible fear of persecution
on a ground enumerated in the United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention).
Applicants would then lawfully enter the United States and
apply for asylum. Successful applicants would remain, and
unsuccessful applicants would face removal. Drawing on the
extant literature on "protected entry procedures" (PEPs) that
once existed in Europe, this Article considers the costs and
benefits of the practice of issuing asylum visas. This Article
concludes that, despite serious and uncertain costs and the
impracticability of issuing asylum visas in some countries, this
practice would likely create substantialbenefits. In particular,it
would likely decrease asylum seekers' reliance on human
smugglers, clear a path to protection for bona fide asylum
seekers, and increase the accuracy of information possessed by
both asylum seekers and the U.S. government. Thus, the asylum
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visa would assist asylum seekers in making better-informed
decisions ex ante and help to achieve a better allocation of
asylum resources ex post. For these reasons, the creation of an
asylum visa and the potential details of such a proposal merit
further study.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
II.

III.

IV.

INTRODUCTION
...........................
......
THE PROBLEM WITH ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES..

1217
1220

A.
B.

The Purposesof Asylum and Refugee Law........
Overview of the Paths to Protection...........

1220
1225

1. Resettlement
....................
......
2. Asylum
...............................
a. Illegal Entry Through Human
Smugglers
............
.............
b. Entry on Nonimmigrant Visas Issued
for Nonasylum Purposes ....
..........
i. Visa Adjudications ......
..........
ii. Types of Nonimmigrant Visas........
a) Students
...................
b) Tourists ..............
.......
3. Assessment of the Current System.............
HISTORY OF THE REFUGEE PROTECTION FRAMEWORK.

1227
1229

1232
1233
1234
1235
1236
1237
1238

A.
B.
C.

1239
1241
1243

A State's Right to GrantAsylum.............
An Individual's Right to Seek Asylum...............
Refugee Convention ......................

1232

1. Nonrefoulement Generally ......
.........
2. Nonrefoulement and "Impunity" for
Illegal Entry
...........................
3. Nonrefoulement Applied to Visa Regimes..
4. Emergence of PEPs
...................
THE ASYLUM VISA
...............................

1246
1247
1249
1252

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

1252
1253
1256
1260
1262

Overview
.......................
.......
Benefits
........................
.......
Costs of Asylum Visa ..............
.........
Objections
.............................
Toward an Ideal Asylum Visa Regime .........
1. Role of Asylum Visa in Context of Other
Visas and Entry Without Inspection ..........
2. Adjudicators of the Visa Must Be Trained
in Refugee Law.............
............
3. Adjudications Must Be Expeditious to
Benefit Asylum Seekers Facing Imminent
Harm and Perform Only a Basic Review
of the Claim for Protection
................

1243

1262
1263

1264

4. Efficacy
V.

1217

OPTIMAL ASYLUM

2013/

CONCLUSION

............................
1264

...........................................

1265

I. INTRODUCTION

Chen Guangcheng, a Chinese human rights activist, escaped
from house arrest in the Shandong Province and entered the U.S.
embassy in Beijing on April 26, 2012, seeking refuge from the
Chinese authorities.' Chen's escape and subsequent sheltering by the
U.S. embassy triggered a diplomatic crisis, calling attention to
China's abuse of rights activists at a time when the two countries
were on the verge of economic talks.2 The embassy sheltered Chen for
six days.3 Chen apparently rejected the idea of political asylum in the
United States and expressed a desire to remain in China, provided
the Chinese authorities would ensure his safety and that of his
family. 4 Chen eventually left the embassy unaccompanied by
embassy officials. 5 Within hours, he concluded that he could not live
safely in China. 6 The U.S. government subsequently negotiated a
deal with the Chinese government that would allow Chen to travel to
the United States on a student visa and enroll at New York
University Law School as a visiting fellow. 7
* Lecturer, University of Florida Levin College of Law. B.A., Stanford University;
J.D., Harvard Law School. Thanks to Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Jennifer Rellis, Sugata Ray,
and Seema Shah for valuable comments and to the participants in the Emerging
Immigration Law Teachers and Scholars Conference in June 2013 for helpful feedback.
I also benefited from presenting this project in an "incubator" session at the
Immigration Law Teachers Workshop of 2012. The views expressed in this article and
any errors are my own.
1.
Chen
Guancheng
Timeline,
WASH.
POST
(May
2,
2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-srv/special/world/chen-guangcheng-timeline/.
2.
Id. (providing an overview of Mr. Chen's escape to the United States).
3.
Martin Patience, China Dissident Chen Guancheng Heads to US, BBC
NEWS (May 19, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18127886.
4.
Jan Perlez & Andrew Jacobs, A Car Chase, Secret Talks, and Second
Thoughts, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/03/world/asialacar-chase-secret-talks-and-second-thoughts.html?pagewanted=2.
5.
Thomas Kaplan, Andrew Jacobs & Steven Lee Myers, Blind Dissident

From China Arrives in US,

Ending Ordeal, N.Y. TIMES (May 19,

2012),

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/20/world/asia/china-dissident-chen-guangchengunited-states.html.
6.
See id. (explaining how Mr. Chen came to change his mind several hours
after initially choosing to remain in China).
7.
See Kaplan, Jacobs & Myers, supra note 5 (explaining that the terms of the
"complex understanding" would permit Mr. Chen "to attend law school on a fellowship
rather than seek asylum"); Steven Lee Myers & Mike Landler, Behind Twists of

Diplomacy in the Case of a Chinese Dissident, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/09/world/asialbehind-twists-of-diplomacy-in-case-ofchen-guangcheng.html?ref=world (discussing the negotiations that "resulted in a
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In this way, the United States resolved the matter temporarily
by granting Chen a student visa and transporting him to the airport.8
Chen boarded a plane to the United States without incident and
without being confronted by the Chinese authorities.9 By avoiding
talk of political asylum, which China considered an "affront,"' 0 this
arrangement allowed China to save face and the United States to
extend protection, however temporary, to Chen.11
Chen's story highlights the core humanitarian concerns of
refugee law as well as the sensitive political and diplomatic
considerations that shape the asylum system. To a lesser extent, it
demonstrates the subterfuge that the U.S. system depends upon-the
admission of refugees on temporary, nonimmigrant visas because the
law neither acknowledges the refugee's intent to seek asylum nor
facilitates that process openly. Although Chen's quest for safety ended
successfully, many lower profile asylum seekers lack access to
protection.
This Article assesses the current methods by which U.S. law
regulates access to the asylum procedure, focusing on the role of
nonimmigrant visas-issued only for purposes other than asylum.
These visas generally require applicants to demonstrate sufficient
wealth and-in some cases-education. 12 These requirements
effectively filter for characteristics that are wholly irrelevant to the
goals of refugee law.1 3 More fundamentally, the system as currently
designed deprives both sides of important information. The migrant
has no information about his or her chances of prevailing in a claim
for asylum prior to incurring significant cost and risk to make the
journey to U.S. territory. 14 Similarly, the U.S. government lacks

second arrangement to allow Mr. Chen to study at New York University but not to seek
asylum").
8.
Myers & Landler, supra note 7.
9.
Id.; Kaplan, Jacobs & Myers, supra note 5, at 2 (suggesting that, after
concluding negotiations, Chinese authorities did not try to prevent Mr. Chen from
leaving China).
10.
Kaplan, Jacobs & Myers, supra note 5, at 2.
11.
See id. at 3 (discussing China's "eager[ness] to blunt the domestic impact of
Mr. Chen's departure").
12.
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(B), (F) (2012) (defining "classes of
nonimmigrant aliens" as exceptions to the term immigrant and outlining the
requirements for a tourist and student visa).
13.
See, e.g., James C. Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve, Making International
Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented
Protection,10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 115, 116 (1997) ("The goal of refugee law, like that of
public international law in general, is not enforceability in a strict sense. It is instead a
mechanism by which governments agree to compromise their sovereign right to
independent action in order to manage complexity, contain conflict, promote decency,
or avoid catastrophe.").
14.
See ECRE Interview with Susanne Bolz, Head of the Protection Unit at the
Swiss Refugee Council (SFH/OSAR), EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON REFUGEES AND EXILES
(ECRE) (Sept. 2, 2011), available at www.ecre.org/component/downloads/downloads/
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knowledge of the applicant's true intentions; that is, whether he or
she is a tourist, a student, a scholar, a refugee, or perhaps none of
these.15
This Article argues for addressing this problem by instituting an
"asylum visa."' 6 Such a visa would be issued at the embassy within
the applicant's home country or in a third country for individuals who
demonstrate, for example, a "credible fear of persecution" 17 and wish
to enter the United States for the purpose of applying for asylum. The
practice of issuing asylum visas would allow the United States to
openly facifitate the journey of applicants with strong claims,
discourage applicants with no chance of success, and reduce asylum
18
seekers' reliance on human smuggling to access U.S. territory.
Although no Western country currently issues asylum visas on a
regular basis, 19 these visas have a rich history rooted in the
experiences of World War II refugees. 20 Thus, they are hardly novel
or unprecedented.

283.html (discussing the value of prescreening to asylum seekers in informing them of
their chances of success).
Cf. OUTI LEPOLA, COUNTERBALANCING EXTERNALIZED BORDER CONTROL FOR
15.
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION NEEDS: HUMANITARIAN VISA AS A MODEL FOR SAFE ACCESS
To ASYLUM PROCEDURES 21 (Collaborative Project, Seventh Framework Programme
2011), available at www.detecter.bham.ac.uk/pdfs/D14_3_HumanitarianVisas.doc
(discussing humanitarian visas as tools to enhance national security by providing more
accurate information to asylum states about the identity of the visa holder).
This term appears in Gregor Noll, New Issues in Refugee Research: From
16.
'ProtectivePassports' to Protected Entry Procedures?The Legacy of Raoul Wallenberg in
the ContemporaryAsylum Debate 11 (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
Working Paper No. 99), available at http://www.unhcr.org/3fd731964.html [hereinafter
Noll, Protective Passports] (quoting a statement by Mr. Ruud Lubbers, UNHCR, that
uses the term asylum visa); id. at 7 (arguing that issuance of such a visa has
historically been part of what was known as a "protected entry procedure," which
existed in several European states until a few years ago and in Switzerland until
2012); ECRE Interview with Susanne Bolz, supra note 14, at 1 (explaining the concept
of special visas for those seeking asylum in Switzerland from abroad); Gregor Noll,
Seeking Asylum at Embassies:A Right to Entry Under InternationalLaw? 17 INT'L. J.
REFUGEE L. 542, 542-44 (2005) (discussing PEPs in Northern EU states); Urs Geiser,
Parliament Moves to Tighten Asylum Laws, SwIss INFO (June 14, 2012),
http://www.swissinfo.chleng/swiss-news/Parliament.movesto tighten-asylumlaws.html?cid=32897538 (reporting that the Swiss government abolished "the possibility of
applying for asylum at Swiss embassies" on June 13, 2012).
See DAVID A. MARTIN ET AL., FORCED MIGRATION: LAW AND POLICY 815 (2d
17.
ed. 2013) (raising the question of whether a visa system should be invalid for failure to
"mandate issuance of a visa to a person who makes a threshold showing (perhaps a
'credible fear of persecution') to the consular officer").
See SHELDON X. ZHANG, SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS 2,
18.
160-61 (2007) (noting that demand for smuggling rises when "legitimate channels [of
entry] are either blocked or inadequate").
19.
For a brief survey of PEPs that existed at various times in EU countries,
see LEPOLA, supra note 15, at 13-17. Lepola includes asylum applications at embassies
(or in-country asylum) as part of the range of PEPs that have been made available to
individuals fleeing from harm in their home countries.
See Noll, Protective Passports, supra note 16, at 3 (characterizing the
20.
history of protection as "so much richer" than is commonly acknowledged); id. at 3-5
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This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II describes the U.S.
refugee protection regime and its political and humanitarian
purposes. The U.S. refugee protection regime includes the
resettlement of overseas refugees in addition to statutory asylum and
the withholding of removal (withholding) for refugees present on U.S.
soil. It further suggests that while resettlement, grounded in the
executive's
authority,
may necessarily
prioritize political
considerations when distributing protection and access, humanitarian
considerations should prevail in the asylum system. 21 Ultimately,
Part II identifies the central problem in the current system of access
to asylum in the United States-that it fails to fully realize its
humanitarian aims because it distributes access to asylum in a
manner that ignores both the need for protection and the strength of
an asylum seeker's claim. Part III considers the history of the current
refugee law framework and explains why the international legal
regime does not require asylum- states to issue visas to asylum
seekers facing acute harm. It also briefly considers the history of
protected entry procedures (PEPs). Part IV describes the asylum visa
in general terms and considers the costs and benefits of this potential
reform, noting its limitations and impracticability in some instances,
but concluding that the idea of an asylum visa warrants further
study.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Purposesof Asylum and Refugee Law
Since the founding of the League of Nations, nations have
recognized the "responsibility of the international community" to
protect refugees. 22 Under the United Nations Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention), a refugee is
any person who .. . owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social

(discussing Sweden's and Switzerland's uses of protective passports during World War
II).
21.
See Deborah E. Anker, DiscretionaryAsylum, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 32-36,
39-40 (1987) (characterizing different purposes of overseas refugee resettlement and
statutory asylum and indicating that "Congress may have institutionalized the
historically different roles of resettlement and asylum: one serves the larger
requirements of U.S. policy; the other responds to the immediate needs of individuals").
22.
See U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF REFUGEES, at 2, RLD1 (1992), reprinted in KAREN
MUSALO, JENNIFER MOORE & RICHARD A. BOSWELL, REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY: A
COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACH 19 (4th ed. 2011) (explaining that "an
awareness of the responsibility of the international community to provide [refugees]
protection, and help them to solve their problems, dates only from the time of the
League of Nations").
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group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and
is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country ... 23

The elements of this definition require that the individual be outside
his or her country of nationality, have a "well-founded fear" of
persecution "for reasons" of a ground enumerated in the treaty, and
be unwilling or unable to return to that country on account of this
fear.24
Refugee law has political as well as humanitarian purposes.
Politically, refugee law represents an effort by states to provide a
coordinated response to the displacement of "involuntary migrants"
by balancing refugees' need for protection with the interests of the
states that absorb them. 25 Accordingly, the international refugee law
framework recognizes few rights or obligations regarding access to
protection other than a limited right against expulsion or return, or
nonrefoulement, once a refugee has effectuated an entry into an
asylum state.2 6 Refugee law creates no right to be granted asylum27
or admission to the asylum state,2 8 nor does it guarantee an asylum
seeker's ability to flee his or her home country or to travel to safety
through lawful means.29 These legal limitations reflect the political
reality that asylum states lack the resources and will to absorb all the
world's refugees. 30 These limitations further demonstrate that
refugee law is far from a field of unfettered humanitarianism. 3 '

23.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, July 28, 1951, 19
U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
24,
See id. (defining the term refugee).
25.
See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 13, at 116 (explaining that
"[i]nternational refugee law was established precisely because it was seen to afford
states a politically and socially acceptable way to maximize border control in the face of
inevitable involuntary migration").
26.
See Refugee Convention, supra note 23, at art. 33 (explaining that "[n]o
Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened").
27.
See JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAw 300-01 (2005) (highlighting the differences between the 'duty of non-refoulement"
and the "right to asylum from persecution").
28.
See id. ("State parties may therefore deny entry to refugees so long as there
is no real chance that their refusal will result in the return of the refugee to face the
risk of being persecuted."); see also Anker, supra note 21, at 3 ("States generally have
not recognized a duty to admit an alien and grant asylum status.").
29.
Cf. Refugee Convention, supra note 23, at Recommendations (A)
(facilitation of refugee travels).
30.
See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 13, at 116-18 (noting that "[w]e can no
longer . . . expect all governments, whatever their circumstances, simply to receive and
provide quality protection to all refugees who arrive at their territory").
31.
Anker, supra note 21, at 42 (counseling not to "read too much into some of
[the Refugee Act's] exhortatory rhetoric").
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Despite the political constraints on refugee protection, a
compelling humanitarian purpose continues to animate refugee law.32
For centuries, societies have honored the "tradition" of shielding
strangers who would face harm if forced to return to their place of
origin.33 According to some scholars, refugee law provides "surrogate
protection" to a refugee when the state fails to fulfill its role of
protecting citizens from violations of core human rights. 34 Courts
around the world have increasingly cast refugee law as a tool for
human rights protection,3 5 and scholars have lauded the expansion of
substantive bases for asylum in the United States to cover
persecution by nonstate actors, especially in cases of violence against
women.3 6
The U.S. refugee protection regime reflects this mix of political
realism and humanitarian stirrings.3 7 The regime currently consists
of refugee resettlement for refugees located abroad and statutory
asylum and withholding for refugees located within U.S. territory or
at the border.3 8 Resettlement and asylum both serve the purpose of
protecting refugees, but they protect very different people for
different reasons.3 9 Overseas refugee resettlement historically has
provided extensive group-based protection on foreign policy grounds,
and statutory asylum and withholding provide individualized

32.

Cf. id. at 41-42 (noting the humanitarian purposes of U.S. asylum law);

David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of
Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1266 (1990) (discussing the "proud tradition" of
offering "asylum to the persecuted" and noting the popularity of bona fide refugees in
the "public imagination").
33.
See MUSALO, MOORE & BOSWELL, supra note 22, at 19 (explaining that
"[r]efugees have been around as long as history").

34.

See Matthew E. Price, Persecution Complex: Justifying Asylum Law's

Preference for Persecuted People, 47 HARv. INT'L L.J. 413, 453-54 (2006) (describing
James Hathaway's "surrogate protection" view); cf. Andrew J. Shacknove, Wo Is a
Refugee?, 95 ETHICS 274, 283 (1985) (arguing for expanding the definition of refugee to
cover internally displaced persons whose states fail to provide them with basic
protection).
35.
See, e.g., Hathaway & Neve, supra note 13, at 117 (characterizing the
"essence of refugee protection as a human rights remedy").
36.
See Deborah E. Anker, Refugee Law, Gender, and the Human Rights
Paradigm, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 133, 135-39 (2002) (explaining that "[g]ender asylum
law has also been a catalytic force in itself, a major vehicle for the articulation and
acceptance of the human rights paradigm").
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
37.
38.
Although asylum and withholding have distinct statutory bases, this
Article treats them together here to emphasize the contrast between these forms of
relief, which are available only after a noncitizen has effectuated an entry or reached
the border, and the overseas resettlement program, which determines refugee status
while the refugee is located abroad. See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No.
82-414 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (setting forth the
laws governing resettlement, asylum, and the withholding of deportation for refugees);
8 U.S.C. § 1157 (2012) (overseas refugee program); id. § 1158 (a)(1) (asylum); id. §
1231(b)(3) (withholding).
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
39.
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protection on more explicitly humanitarian grounds. 40 For example,
the greatest beneficiaries of the U.S. resettlement program have
traditionally been refugees from countries where the United States
has engaged in war, such as Vietnam and Iraq, or nationals of enemy
nations. 41 The greatest beneficiaries of asylum, however, have been
from China and Ethiopia. 42
The U.S. refugee protection regime seeks to protect refugees, but
it cannot protect everyone in the world who satisfies the definition of
a refugee. 43 Accordingly, the question arises: whose claims should
have priority? Whose claims should the United States attract, and
whose should it deter? Scholars have debated this question with
respect to overseas refugee resettlement for decades, and many
support the view that the United States should channel its limited
refugee protection resources toward those individuals who, otherwise
satisfying the definition of refugee, need it most-those who face the
greatest harm from persecution as defined by its imminence and
severity. 44 Others defend a system that prioritizes the claims of

Anker, supra note 21, at 31-36.
40.
Susan Raufer, In-Country Processingof Refugees, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 233,
41.
254-55 (1995). More recently, the greatest numbers of refugees admitted through the
overseas refugee program were from Iraq and Burma. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF
POPULATION, REFUGEES, & MIGRATION, FY 2011 REFUGEE ADMISSION STATISTICS (Jan.
31, 2012), availableat http://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/statistics/184843.htm.
42.
See Office of Planning, Analysis, & Tech., Immigration Courts FY 2011
Asylum Statistics by Nationality, in EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUST., FY 2011 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 2-3 (Feb. 2012), available at
(demonstrating the number of
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fyllsyb.pdf
applications for asylum granted in FY 2011).
See David A. Martin, The Refugee Concept: On Definitions, Politics, and
43.
Careful Use of a Scarce Resource, in REFUGEE POLICY: CANADA AND THE UNITED
STATES 30, 34-37 (Howard Adelman ed., 1991) (explaining the tension between
"genuinely wish[ing] to provide [a] haven for the persecuted" and the "value [ofl the
reassurance that comes from reasonable control over the entry of aliens").
See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, The Making of United States Refugee
44.
Policy: Separation of Powers in the Post-Cold War Era, 70 WASH. L. REV. 675, 699
(1995) ("[Olne can distinguish within the class of refugees both by the likelihood of
persecution and by the harm they will face if the threatened persecution
materializes."); Raufer, supra note 41, at 252-53 (noting that a goal of refugee
protection is to protect people facing imminent danger); Court Robinson & Bill Frelick,
Lives in the Balance: The Political and HumanitarianImpulses in US Refugee Policy,
INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 293, 297 (1990) ("[O]ur principal recommendation is that a single
criterion be used to govern our refugee and asylum programme-priority must be given
to those with the greatest need for protection.") (alteration in original); id. at 301
(advocating for a resettlement program that uses an "index of vulnerability" that
considers the "nature of persecution suffered or feared" and prioritizes claims based on
"life-threatening or especially acute" harm, among other factors); Daniel J. Steinbock,
The Qualities of Mercy, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 951, 973 (2003) ("[T]he most
important factors [measuring the relative need for protection] are the degree and
probability of harm."). This view resonates with the intuition that scarce resources
should be allocated to maximize the objective function and assumes that the objective
function of refugee protection is to protect refugees from severe and imminent harm.
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refugees who share ideological, ethnic, or religious commitments with
large portions of the population. 45
Few scholars, however, have considered this question of priority
in the context of asylum. 46 Asylum is typically cast as a passive,
residual 47 form of relief, one that has no numerical limit, and
therefore, one for which the question of priority simply does not
arise. 48 In theory, the secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security or the U.S. attorney general could, in his or her discretion,
grant every single meritorious asylum claim that is filed in the
United States. 49 However, this characterization glosses over the ways
by which the United States selects its asylum seekers in the first
place through its principal tool of migration control: the visa
system.5 0 Far from avoiding the question of prioritization, the current
system implicitly prioritizes asylum claims at the source by limiting
access to travel and entry. 51 U.S. law prioritizes claims from those
who make it on to U.S. shores without any inquiry into the likelihood
and severity of the persecution they face before they arrive. 5 2
This Article posits that asylum should generally be granted to
those individuals who, otherwise satisfying the definition of refugee,
need protection the most. Considering the mismatch between the goal

45.

See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND

EQUALITY 48-51 (1983) (explaining that "we can also be bound to help men and women
persecuted or oppressed by someone else-if they are persecuted or oppressed because
they are like us"); see also MUSALO, MOORE & BOSWELL, supra note 22, at 83 (noting
that some scholars have advocated an approach based on "choos[ing] among the victims
on the basis of ethnic, religious or ideological affinity").
46.
But see Robinson & Frelick, supra note 44, at 305 (advocating for
prioritizing asylum claims based on objective human rights criteria); see also Price,
supra note 34, at 465 (arguing for prioritizing claims based on the "persecution
criterion" rather than simply humanitarian need).
47.
See Martin, supra note 32, at 1259-60 (describing Congress's approach to
asylum as "largely a legislative afterthought").
48.
This assertion is an inference drawn from the dearth of discussion of
"priority" regarding asylum and the abundance of such discussion with respect to
resettlement. See supranote 44.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1) (2012) (describing the "[c]onditions for granting
49.
asylum").
See GUY GOODWIN-GILL & JANE McADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL
50.
LAw 374 (3d ed. 2007) (describing "visa regimes" as a "permissible tool of immigration
control").
51.
See, e.g., Hathaway & Neve, supra note 13, at 120 ("[Mlost Northern states
impose a visa requirement on the nationals of refugee-producing states, and penalize
airlines and other transportation companies for bringing unauthorized refugees into
their territories. By refusing to grant visas for the purpose of making a claim for
asylum, Northern countries have been able to insulate themselves from many potential
claimants of refugee status."); GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 50, at 37-76
(discussing the exploitation and deterrent effects of visa regimes).
52.
Cf. Anker, supra note 21, at 35-36, 39 n.189 ("Whether those who arrive at
our borders, by virtue of that fact, have demonstrated greater desperation, greater
resourcefulness, or some combination of both, is a difficult issue and one that Congress
did not seem to address.").
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of refugee protection and the purposes of migration control, Congress
should consider reforming the law's method of distributing access to
the asylum procedure. It is not enough merely (to aspire) to rank by
relative need the claims of those applicants who are already present5 3
for the neediest asylum seekers are also most likely the ones with the
least access to U.S. shores. 54 To truly realize the protective potential
of asylum, the system should consider the applicant's need for
protection at the point of providing access to the territory. Only
through such a change can the United States ensure that the law
allocates its scarce5 5 asylum resources optimally.
One objection to this premise is that the United States should
embrace the preference for those who happen to be "in our midst." 56
On this view, asylum should be available exclusively to "the lucky or
the aggressive, who have somehow managed to make their way across
our borders. . . ." 7 According to this view, asylum is as much a

benefit for the United States as it is for the asylum seeker; by offering
asylum, the United States avoids the harsh act of deporting a refugee
from its territory. 58
However, such a view focuses excessively on the needs of the
asylum state at the expense of the asylum seeker. Moreover, it
glosses over the legal and policy framework that screens those "lucky
or aggressive" 5 9 migrants for particular traits that happen to be
irrelevant to asylum.

B. Overview of the Paths to Protection
The 1980 Refugee Act 60 (the Act) is the centerpiece of U.S.
refugee law. 61 Through the Act, Congress codified international

53.
Cf. Robinson & Frelick, supra note 44, at 304-05 (noting that "a rating
scale based on measurable human rights criteria might, in fact, be helpful in guiding
adjudicators to appreciate in a more objective fashion the situations asylum applicants
are fleeing").
54.
Cf. ECRC Interview with Susanne Bolz, supra note 14, at 2-3 (discussing
the role of PEPs in facilitating protection for asylum seekers facing a "crisis" or an
"acute" harm).
55.
Martin, supra note 43, at 36.
56.
Anker, supra note 21, at 42-43. Price calls this a "proximity bias." Price,
supra note 34, at 446-48.
57.
WALZER, supra note 45, at 50-51.
58.
Id. at 51; see also Price, supra note 34, at 448 ("To deny admission to
refugees at our border, and force them to return to countries to face serious harm,
violates the injunction to 'do no harm,' and thus implicates us in having caused their
plight.").
WALZER, supra note 45, at 51.
59.
60.
Refugee Act, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
61.
See Deborah E. Anker & Michael Posner, The Forty Years Crisis: A
Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 11 (1981)
(characterizing the Act as "the most comprehensive United States law ever enacted
concerning refugee admissions and resettlement").
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commitments to protect refugees and divided authority over refugee
policy between the president and Congress, ending a 40-year period of
scattered, 62 ideologically driven asylum policy. 63 In the early and
middle parts of the twentieth century, the executive branch had used
its parole authority to grant asylum to refugees in response to mass
migrations. 64 Critics and members of Congress decried the system as
ad hoc and overly political.65 After years of attempts at reform, the
final compromise reflected agreement on four principal areas.66 First,
it incorporated the definition of refugee contained in the Refugee
Convention and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967
Protocol), and it extended protection to certain additional persons
when authorized by the president. 67 Second, it codified the Refugee
Convention's obligation not to return (refouler) refugees to territories
where their life or freedom would be threatened, creating a
mandatory 6 8 form of relief known today as withholding.6 9 Third, it
provided for the president, in consultation with Congress, to
determine the numerical cap for refugee admissions through the
overseas refugee program. 70 Fourth, it created a uniform procedure
for discretionary asylum to noncitizens who are "physically present in
the United States or at a land border or port of entry," and it provided

62.

See id. at 12 (characterizing the purpose of the Act as moving away from

"ad hoc refugee admission procedures").
63.
See id. at 13 (noting that the executive branch "viewed refugee admission
as an instrument of foreign policy").
64.
See id. at 15 (discussing the use of parole authority for mass admission of
Hungarian refugees).
65.
See, e.g., id. at 30-31 (quoting Senator Edward Kennedy's criticism of the
executive's practice of waiting until a refugee crisis develops and then using an
emergency parole program to admit refugees on a mass scale); id. at 46 (quoting
Ambassador William Clark's testimony that the most current emergency "should not
blind us to the hardships" faced by refugees from other regions of the world); id. at 63
(quoting Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm's observation that only a miniscule number
of refugees admitted to the United States since World War II have been from Africa or
Latin America).
66.
See id. at 64 ("[T]he Refugee Act is the product of years of debate and
compromise.").
67.
Id. at 60; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012) (extending refugee status to persons
who remain within their country of origin, where authorized by the president).
68.
See Anker & Posner, supra note 61, at 56 ("[T]he House and Senate
Committees eliminated the discretionary element in the withholding provision making
its provisions mandatory."); Martin, supra note 32, at 1260 ("Congress changed INA
234(h) to a mandatory form, leaving no doubt about the obligatory character of the
nonrefoulement provisions in domestic law.").
69.
See 8 U.S.C § 1231(b)(3) (2012) (establishing a general principle of
"restriction on removal to a country where [an] alien's life or freedom would be
threatened"). The U.S. Supreme Court has determined that withholding is owed only to
a subset of refugees who can prove a higher likelihood of harm, namely that it is "more
likely than not" that their life or freedom would be threatened if removed to a
particular country. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1984).
70.
Anker & Posner, supranote 61, at 61.
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for "the adjustment of status for asylees." 71 Thus, the Act
incorporated the Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, clarified the
nonrefoulement obligation, and codified two paths to refugee
protection: 1) overseas resettlement for refugees located abroad
outside their home countries and 2) statutory asylum and
withholding for refugees within U.S. territory or at the border or a
port of entry.
Both refugee resettlement and statutory asylum play important
roles in refugee protection. Traditionally, the United States has
admitted more refugees for resettlement than it has granted
statutory asylum claims.7 2 In fiscal year (FY) 2011, 56,424 refugees
were admitted through the resettlement program. 7 During that
same period, the United States received 41,000 applications for
statutory asylum. 74 Of these, 27,300 were filed "affirmatively" and
13,600 were filed "defensively." Over 11,500 applications were
granted.75
The next two subparts sketch out the mechanics of resettlement
and asylum to illuminate the explicit and implicit policy choices that
prevent many worthy claims of asylum from ever being heard.
1.

Resettlement

Tens of thousands of refugees who have fled their countries of
origin may qualify for resettlement annually through the United
States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP). 76 USRAP is a
collaboration of several government agencies and voluntary
organizations.77 The Department of State's (the State Department)
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), the

71.
Id. at 62.
72.
Compare MUSALO, MOORE & BOSWELL, supra note 22, at 79 (refugee
admissions statistics for 2001-2010), with EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REV., U.S.
DEP'T OF JUST., FY 2010 ASYLUM STATISTICS (2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/
eoir/efoia/FY10AsyStats-Current.pdf (2010 asylum grant statistics), and EXEC. OFFICE
FOR IMMIGRATION REV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., FY 2009 ASYLUM STATISTICS (2013),
available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/efoia/FYO9AsyStats-Current.pdf (2009 asylum
grant statistics), and EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., FY
2008 ASYLUM STATISTICS (2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/efoial
FYO8AsyStats-Current.pdf (2008 asylum grant statistics).
73.
BUREAU OF POPULATION, REFUGEES, AND MIGRATION, FY 11 REFUGEE
ADMISSIONS STATISTICS (2012), available at http://www.state.gov/j/prmlreleases/
statistics/184843.htm.
74.
EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., FY 2011 ASYLUM
STATISTICS (2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/efoia/FYllAsyStatsCurrent.pdf (documenting that the United States received 40,729 asylum applications
in FY 2011 not abandoned or withdrawn).
75.
Id.
76.
See U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/admissions/index.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2013) (listing
the government agencies and nongovernmental organizations contributing to USRAP).
Id.
77.
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Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS), and the Department of Health and
Human Services' Office of Refugee Resettlement are each involved.78
Under the Act, the president, in consultation with Congress,
determines the maximum number of refugees that the United States
can resettle during the coming FY.T7 In FY 2011, the cap for all
regions combined was 80,000, but the United States actually
admitted 56,424 refugees during this period. 80 Admission numbers
have traditionally fallen short of the cap, suggesting that the United
States does not resettle as many refugees as it could. 81 Yet, the
United States resettles more refugees than "all other resettlement
countries combined."8 2
USRAP considers applications primarily from refugees who have
fled their home country and who have registered with the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).8 3 The
UNHCR determines whether the individual qualifies as a refugee and
determines the "best possible durable solution" for the individual,
whether it be "safe return to the home country," "local integration" in
the country to which the individual fled, or "third-country
resettlement." 84 In some cases, the UNHCR may refer a refugee
applicant to USRAP. 85 One of nine Resettlement Support Centers
(RSC) worldwide then processes the case. 86 A USCIS officer
interviews the applicant face-to-face and reviews "the information
that the RSC has collected."87 Successful applicants may be admitted
to the United States as refugees. 88

Id.
78.
79.
8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(2) (2012).
80.
BUREAU OF POPULATION, REFUGEES, AND MIGRATION, DEP'T OF STATE, FY
11 REFUGEE ADMISSIONS STATISTICS (2012), available at http://www.state.gov/j/prml
releases/statistics/184843.htm. The combined cap for FY 2010 was also 80,000, and the
United States admitted 73,311 refugees during this period. BUREAU OF POPULATION,
REFUGEES, AND MIGRATION, DEP'T OF STATE, FY 10 REFUGEE ADMISSIONS STATISTICS
(2010), availableat http://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/statistics/181160.htm.
81.
See, e.g., BUREAU OF POPULATION, REFUGEES, AND MIGRATION, DEP'T OF
STATE,
FY
10 REFUGEE ADMISSIONS
STATISTICS
(2010),
available at
http://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/statistics/181160.htm (showing
a
refugee
admissions ceiling of 80,000 with 73,311 actually admitted).
82.
See
U.S.
Refugee
Admissions,
U.S.
DEP'T
OF
STATE,
http://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2013) (noting that, of the "15.4
million refugees in the world," "less than one percent ... are eventually resettled in
third countries" and that the United States admits "over half of these refugees").
83.
See id. ("The first step for most refugees is to register with the [UNHCR] in
the country to which s/he has fled.").
Id.
84.
85.
See U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, supra note 77 ("When UNHCR ...
refers a refugee applicant to the United States for resettlement, the case is first
received and processed by a Resettlement Support Center (RSC).").
Id.
86.
Id.
87.
88.
8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(1) (2012).
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Scholars and policymakers have criticized the resettlement
program for prioritizing foreign policy objectives over humanitarian
need.8 9 However, some have also noted that a program over which the
president has such extensive discretion will inevitably privilege
foreign policy considerations over humanitarian ones.9 0 As it was
designed to achieve U.S. policy objectives, 9 ' and not to vindicate
human rights abuses, the very character of resettlement is
irreducibly political.9 2 Thus, it is unsurprising that USRAP was not
designed to give priority to refugees who face the most severe or
imminent harm.93 Instead, the numbers allocated to each region have
historically reflected the United States' Cold War priorities-namely,
undermining Communist regimes by admitting their fleeing
nationals. 9 Access to USRAP is also limited by the applicant's
location and ties to the United States,9 5 thus placing it beyond the
reach of most refugees. 96 In sum, despite the creation of a priority for
refugees who pose a "special humanitarian concern," overseas
resettlement by design does not offer protection to those refugees who
need it most.97
2.

Asylum

Given the United States' long history of refugee resettlement and
the comparatively recent phenomenon of asylum seekers traveling to
U.S. territory, the purpose of statutory asylum is not immediately
apparent. 98 Indeed, scholars have characterized asylum as a

89.
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
90.
See Legomsky, supra note 44, at 701 (noting the "inherent unreality of
expecting" the president to weigh humanitarian considerations over foreign affairs).
91.
See Anker, supra note 21, at 39-40 (explaining that resettlement has
historically served "the larger requirements of U.S. policy").
92.
Id. at 46.
93.
See id. at 36 ("[Aldmission decisions are not ... prioritized individually
based on the relative desperation of the applicant's plight, the strength of his
persecution claim, or his need for protection."). But see Raufer, supra note 41, at 252
(discussing one goal of the refugee program as the "protection of persons in imminent
danger").
94.
See Tahl Tyson, The Refugee Act of 1980: Suggested Reforms in the
Overseas Refugee Program to Safeguard Humanitarian Concerns from Competing
Interests, 65 WASH. L. REV. 921, 921-38 (1990), reprinted in MUSALO, MOORE &
BOSWELL, supra note 22, at 81 (highlighting the political considerations at play in the
formulation of U.S. refugee policy).
95.
Anker, supra note 21, at 36.
96.
See id. ("[F]or most persons in need of protection there is no practical
opportunity for admission [through USRAP], even in those cases where the applicants
are members of a designated nationality group.").
97.
For criticism of overseas resettlement as insufficiently directed at helping
those refugees in greatest need, see supra note 44.
98.
See Martin, supra note 32, at 1258 ("[Until recently], [r]esponding to
refugees meant resettling displaced persons from refugee camps overseas, rather than
dealing with populations already on national territory."); see also Martin, supra note
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"legislative afterthought."9 9 Deborah Anker and Michael Posner's
analysis of the legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress
sought to protect asylum applicants' interest in due process and to
prevent the abuse of existing asylum procedures. 100 More
fundamentally, Congress sought to institutionalize a mechanism for
"select[ing] refugees based primarily on humanitarian criteria." 101
Although the legislative history does not indicate that Congress
sought to prioritize humanitarian considerations over all others,
commentators have suggested few other compelling purposes,
especially given the overtly political purposes of resettlement.102
The current framework for permitting access to the asylum
procedure does not serve these humanitarian ends adequately. It
offers no method of attracting strong claims or deterring weak
ones. 103 This is largely due to the system's reliance on- irregular
migration.104 Under the Refugee Convention, illegal entry does not
bar an application for asylum, 0 5 so an asylum seeker may apply for
asylum without penalty after having entered either without
inspection or pursuant to a valid visa. 106 However, because satisfying
the definition of a refugee is not a basis for receiving a U.S. visa, 0 7
"as a practical matter, most asylum seekers cannot use the normal
migration procedures to reach U.S.. . . soil and apply for asylum." 0 8

43, at 35 ("We did not have to confront this built-in tension [between refugee status
and immigration control] so baldly in earlier times, largely because physical distances
and the cost of travel provided natural limitations on the numbers who might seek
extra-regional asylum. . . .").
99.
Martin, supra note 32, at 1260 ("Even though asylum applications were
increasing throughout the period of legislative deliberation [over the Refugee
Act] . . . , asylum was again largely a legislative afterthought.").

100.
Anker & Posner, supra note 61, at 41.
101.
Anker, supra note 21, at 39.
102.
See supra notes 37-42. But see Price, supra note 34, at 424 (discussing the
purpose of asylum as a way to shame nations).
103.
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(A)-(V) (2012) (listing classes applicable for
nonimmigrant visas, none of which relate to humanitarian need).
104.
See HATHAWAY, supra note 27, at 292 ("Because a visa will not be issued for
the purpose of seeking refugee protection, only those who lie about their intentions or
secure forged documentation are able successfully to satisfy the inquiries of the
transportation company employees who effectively administer [the asylum state's] law
abroad.").
105.
See Refugee Convention, supra note 23, at art. 31, 1 1 ("The Contracting
States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on
refugees who . . . enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided
they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their
illegal entry or presence.").
106.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2012) ("Any alien who is physically present in the
Unites States or who arrives in the United States . . . irrespectiveof such alien's status,
may apply for asylum .... ) (emphasis added).
107.
See MARTIN ET AL., supra note 17, at 774 ("Satisfying the refugee definition
is not a basis for receiving a U.S. visa, although it can provide a basis ... for papers
that will ultimately lead to admission under the overseas refugee program.").
108.
Id. at 594.
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Moreover, even those asylum seekers who initially entered after
obtaining a valid visa either violate the terms of the visa after arrival
(by seeking to remain in the United States indefinitely) or have
committed fraud in obtaining papers. 0 9 As a result, they are typically
"out-of-status" by the time they apply for asylum.110 Thus, the asylum
system expects and relies upon illegal or deceptive entry,"' and there
is almost no way for a person in the United States to be both an
asylum seeker and a lawfully present foreign national.11 2 Although
unlawful entry does not and should not prejudice an asylum seeker's
claim in light of the many barriers to a lawful entry, na it is
surprising that the law does not make any attempt to lift this burden
for applicants who face acute harm.114
As described below, the current system provides two principal
paths of access to the asylum procedure, neither of which selects
asylum seekers based on relevant traits. The first is entrance through
smuggling. 115 The second is entrance on a valid nonimmigrant
visa.116

109.
See Anker, supra note 21, at 29 ("The only group of out-of-status asylum
seekers, other than those who enter undocumented or with false documents, are aliens
who enter in a lawful status, but subsequently overstay the period of time authorized
or otherwise violate the original conditions of their entry.").
110.

Id. at 29 (quoting T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND

POLICY (1985)).
111.
See id. at 28 ("[B]eing an asylum seeker and entering 'irregularly' are
inextricably linked.") (citations omitted).
112.
See id. at 29-30 (noting that the Board of Immigration Appeals'
preoccupation with fraudulent documents or illegal entry leaves asylum available only
to people "subject to political changes" who become refugees after entry in the asylum
state or refugees surplace).
113.
See id. at 5 ("[Rlefugees are by definition persons who lack entry or travel
documentation and whose desperate search for a country of refuge often leaves them
with little alternative but to use false documentation in order gain airline passage, exit
from other countries, or entry into the United States.").
114.
Cf. James C. Hathaway, The Emerging Politics of Non-entrde, REFUGEES
40, 40 (1992) (discussing the ways in which Northern countries have imposed burdens
on asylum seekers attempting to enter asylum states).
115.
See, e.g., Cleo J. Kung, Supporting the Snakeheads: Human Smuggling
from China and the 1996 Amendment to the U.S. Statutory Definition of "Refugee", 90
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1271, 1295 (2000) (discussing Chinese asylum seekers' use
of human smugglers to access U.S. territory).
116.
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(A)-(V) (2012) (listing grounds for nonimmigrant
visas); see also Rachel D. Settlage, Affirmatively Denied: The Detrimental Effects of a
Reduced Grant Rate for Affirmative Asylum Seekers, 27 B. U. INT'L L.J. 61, 65-68
(2009) (discussing asylum seekers' use of and difficulty in obtaining nonimmigrant
visas to access U.S. territory).
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a. ,Illegal Entry Through Human Smugglers
Human smuggling is an important and dangerous form of illegal
entry for asylum seekers and other migrants. 117 Smugglers
"essentially peddl[e] services for financial gain in exchange for the
illegal entry into a country of someone who either does not qualify for
or is not willing [or able] to go through legal channels."1 18 Smugglers
bring roughly 500,000 undocumented migrants into the United States
annually.1 19 Another 500,000 undocumented migrants enter without
smugglers. 120 Chinese "snakeheads" move thirty thousand to forty
thousand Chinese nationals into the United States illegally each
year, 12 1 some of whom subsequently apply for asylum. 122 People who
retain the services of a smuggler often pay thousands of U.S. dollars
in fees. 123 Others cram into vehicles, nearly a dozen to a car, or stow
away in commercial fishing vessels or freight boats. 124 Migrants who
use smugglers not only take serious physical risks and incur
significant costs to enter the United States, but they often face
retribution by "street gangs" if they fail to pay the fees due to the
smugglers. 125 As a result, migrants who use smugglers risk torture
and death if they are unable to pay.126
b.

Entry on Nonimmigrant Visas Issued for Nonasylum Purposes

Aside from entry without inspection, asylum seekers may enter
using a nonimmigrant visa.12 7 Although previously rare, passports
and visas became crucial after World War I for anyone who wished to
cross a national boundary. 128 The United States first authorized

117.
See Kung, supra note 115, at 1275, 1305 ("[T]he 1996 Amendment
facilitated a dramatic rise in the number of Chinese migrants smuggled into the
U.S ..... Debt-collectors [then] use brutal tactics [on behalf of smugglers] to
insure . . . full payment [from those brought into the country].").
118.
ZHANG, supranote 18, at 23.
119.
Id. at 18.
120.
Id.
121.
Id. at 18-19.
122.
See Kung, supra note 115, at 1286 ("Chinese migrants apprehended by the
INS can . .. escape immediate deportation by seeking asylum.").
123.
See ZHANG, supra note 18, at 59 (describing an anecdote of Eastern
European migrants who paid a smuggler $5,000 to $9,000 to cross the Mexico-U.S.
border from Tijuana).
124.
Id. at 60, 70.
125.
Id. at 71.
126.
See id. ("[S]tories of migrants being assaulted, tortured, and even killed
have appeared frequently in the news media.").
127.
Settlage, supra note 116, at 66.
128.
See BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, THE VISA FUNCTION 1, available at
http://www.travel.state.gov/pdflFY2000%20visa%20function.pdf ("In 1917, a general
requirement that all aliens seeking to enter the United States obtain visas was
instituted and has been continued since that time .... ).
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consular officials to issue visas to "certain" noncitizens in 1884.129 In
1917, it imposed a "general requirement" that all noncitizens seeking
to enter the United States obtain a visa. 130
Current U.S. law requires most foreign nationals to obtain visas
prior to entering the United States. 131 Although visas do not
guarantee admission, 132 they allow a foreign national to request
admission at the border. 133 Common carriers bound for the
destination country also require foreign nationals to produce
sufficient travel documents, including a valid visa, and carriers face
sanctions for permitting any person to board without such
documents.1 34 Accordingly, it is generally not possible for a foreign
national to board a vessel bound for the United States without
documentation of the foreign national's right to seek admission. 3 5
For asylum seekers who cannot or do not wish to hire a human
smuggler to enter without inspection, the only remaining options are
lying to the consulate about their intentions or obtaining fraudulent
papers.136 This subterfuge at the heart of the U.S. asylum system
may reveal U.S. ambivalence about the humanitarian purposes of
asylum.' 37
i.

Visa Adjudications

Foreign nationals apply for visas in U.S. consulates abroad,
typically in their home country.' 3 8 Consular officials, who possess
"special training in the visa process" and expertise regarding "local
culture," adjudicate visa applications filed at the consulate where
they are posted. 139 Consular officials review the paperwork and

129.
Id.
130.
Id.
James A. R. Nafziger, Review of Visa Denials by Consular Officers, 66
131.
WASH. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1991). But see Visa Waiver Program (VWP), U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
http://travel.state.gov/visaltemp/without/without_1990.html#overview (last visited Oct.
20, 2013) (listing countries the citizens of which need not obtain a visa prior to
traveling to the United States).
132.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1185(d) (2012) (providing for the nonadmission of certain
aliens).
133.
See Nafziger, supra note 131, at 14 ("A visa is ... more of a clearance to
request admission by the INS at the border or other port of entry.").
134.
See MARTIN ET AL., supra note 17, at 774 ("Carriers are not supposed to
permit a noncitizen who lacks a passport or visa to board a vessel or plane bound for
the United States (unless the visa requirement is inapplicable), and they are subject to
significant fines if they fail in this duty.").
Id.
135.
136.
HATHAWAY, supra note 27, at 292; see also supranote 105.
137.
See Martin, supra note 43, at 36 (discussing limitations on asylum that
result from states' fears of political backlash).
138.
See Nafziger, supra note 131, at 9 (illustrating typical visa application
procedures).
139.
Id. at 53-54.
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conduct face-to-face interviews with applicants. 140 They attempt to
discern the applicant's intentions, especially regarding the applicant's
intention to leave the United States before the visa expires. 14 '
Consular officials may not deny a visa application absent
knowledge or "reason to believe" that the applicant is ineligible.14 2
Accordingly, they must base a denial on known facts about the
applicant.143 However, once the official denies a visa, the applicant
has limited recourse. 144 The Visa Office in the Bureau of Consular
Affairs of the State Department may review denials, but the
applicant is not entitled to notice of this review, and further
administrative or judicial review is unavailable under current law.145
ii.

Types of Nonimmigrant Visas

Although visa regimes serve the legitimate purpose of migration
control, 146 they also deter asylum seekers 147 and filter them for
particular characteristics. 148 Under U.S. law, the most common
nonimmigrant visas impose stringent requirements and, most
importantly, require proof of intent not to immigrate to the United
States. 149 The law presumes every foreign national to be an
immigrant "until he establishes to the satisfaction of the consular

U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
140.
See
Temporary Visitors to the U.S.,
http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/temp_1305.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2013) (describing
the process of applying for and processing a visa, including the interview at the
embassy).
141.
See Nafziger, supra note 131, at 13 (analyzing relevant factors for the
adjudication of applications for nonimmigrant visas).
142.
Id. at 12.
143.
Id.
144.
Id.
See id. at 93-94 (illustrating the review process for visa denials); see also
145.
Donald S. Dobkin, Challenging the Doctrine of Consular Non-Reviewability, 24 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 113, 122 (2010) (noting that the "doctrine of consular non-reviewability
still persists [in the United States]").
146.
GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 50, at 374.
147.
See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 13, at 120 (discussing the deterrent
effect of visas and noting that "[b]y refusing to grant visas for the purpose of making a
claim to asylum, Northern countries have been able to insulate themselves from many
potential claimants of refugee status"); see also Satvinder Juss, Sovereignty, Culture,
and Community: Refugee Policy and Human Rights in Europe, UCLA J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 463, 483-84 (Fall/Winter 1998-1999) (discussing the deterrent effect of
the EU visa regime).
148.
Cf. Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of
ImmigrationLaw, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 825 (2007) (discussing the ex ante screening of
noncitizens under U.S. law based on "pre-entry credentials, credentials that are
determined in advance and identified at the border").
149.
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(15)(F)(i) (2012) ("[A]n alien having a residence
in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning, who is a bona fide
student .... ); see also MARTIN ET AL., supra note 17, at 774 (". . . U.S. law bars the
issuance of a nonimmigrant visa in the most widely used categories, such as a student
or tourist, if there are indications that the person intends, for any reason to abandon
his or her foreign residence.").

2013/

OPTIMAL ASYLUM

1235

officer, at the time of application for a visa . .. that he is entitled to
nonimmigrant status under [Immigration and Nationality Act]
section 101(a)(15)."150

The specific requirements of each of these visas bear no
relationship to the merits of an asylum applicant's claim; indeed, the
requirement of proof of nonimmigrant intent and rejection of "dual
intent" 15 1 means that an applicant who indicates a desire to apply for
asylum will most likely have his or her application denied. 152
Nonimmigrant visas also typically require the applicant to submit
evidence of wealth, education, or extraordinary scientific, artistic, or
athletic skill.' 5 3 Below, this Article focuses on student and tourist
visas, which are two of the most common nonimmigrant visas
issued.1'5 4
a)

Students

To be eligible for the "F visa," the applicant must show that he or
she is a bona fide student, has no intent to remain in the United
States after his or her course of study has ended, and has the funds
sufficient to pay for his or her educational program.15 5 The State
Department further cautions that applicants "should be prepared to
provide" transcripts
from previous
institutions
attended,
standardized test scores, and "financial evidence that shows that you
or your [sponsor] has sufficient funds to cover your tuition and living
expenses during the period of your intended stay."156 The consulate
may require tax returns or bank statements as additional evidence of
ability to pay.' 5 7 Under current law, a student is ineligible for this

150.
8 U.S.C. § 1184 (b) (2012).
151.
Dual intent refers to a nonimmigrant's intent to remain in the United
States "permanently in accordance with the law, should the opportunity to do so
present itself." T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 400
(6th ed. 2008) (internal citation omitted).
152.
See MARTIN ET AL., supra note 17, at 774 ("[A] consular officer's judgment
that the visa applicant may be interested in asylum in the United States could even
lead to the refusal of a temporary-visit visa for which the applicant seems otherwise
qualified.").
153.
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 (a)(15)(J), (0), (P) (2012) (defining "scholars,"
"artist[ists] [and] athlete[es] ... [of] sustained national or international acclaim," and
"performers").
154.
See DEP'T OF STATE, NONIMMIGRANT VISAS ISSUED, FIScAL YEAR 2011,
Table XVII (Part I), available at http://www.travel.state.gov/pdflFY11AnnualReportTable%20XVII.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2013) (indicating that the grand total of F visas
issued in FY 2011 was 476,072 and the grand total of B visas issued during this period
was 4,349,087).
155.
Student Visas, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://travel.state.gov/visaltemp/
types/types_1268.html#6 (last visited Oct. 20, 2013) (explaining the requirements and
steps to obtain an F visa).
156.

Id.

157.

Id.
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visa if, at the time of applying for it, he or she intends to remain in
the United States after graduation.' 5 8
b)

Tourists

To be eligible for the "B visa," commonly known as the "tourist"
visa, the criteria are less numerous but equally focused on wealth.' 5 9
The applicant must show that he or she has sufficient funds to cover
his or her expenses for the trip, that he or she has sufficient ties
outside the United States to ensure that he or she will leave when her
visa expires, and that the purpose of the trip is for "business,
pleasure, or for medical treatment." 16 0
The consular official's determination as to whether the applicant
is likely to become a public charge requires the official to make
"speculative predictions."'16 For some visa adjudications, consular
officials may look to the applicant's savings on deposit, as well as his
or her "total estate and income potential." 62
Not surprisingly, applicants from poorer countries have great
difficulties obtaining tourist visas.1 63 For example, in FY 2011, the
adjusted refusal rate for tourist visas from Somalia was nearly 67
percent; from Ghana, 59 percent; from Mauritania, 61 percent; and
from Laos, nearly 75 percent.1 64 Issuance of these visas has also
plummeted after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.165
Nonimmigrant visas are harder than ever to obtain for many foreign
nationals.166
By their requirements, the student and tourist visas privilege
wealthy, more educated applicants and discourage poor, less educated

158.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F) (2012) (requiring a nonimmigrant seeking to
enter as a student to be "an alien having a residence in a foreign country which he has
no intention of abandoning"); see also Daniel Walfish, Note, Student Visas and the
Illogic of the Intent Requirement, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 473, 479 (2003) (discussing the
denial of an F visa due to the student's failure to prove nonimmigrant intent).
159.
See generally Visitor Visas - Business and Pleasure,U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/types/types_1262.html#4 (last visited Oct. 20, 2013).
Some inquiry into the applicant's wealth is necessary to ensure that the applicant is
not inadmissible due to a likelihood of becoming a public charge under 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(4) (2012).
160.
Id.
See Nafziger, supra note 131, at 18 (explaining the controversy and
161.
safeguards surrounding "speculative predictions" made by consular officials).
Id.
162.
163.
Adjusted Refusal Rate - B-Visas Only, by Nationality, Fiscal Year 2011,
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.travel.state.gov/pdflFY11.pdf (last visited Oct. 20,
2013) (providing the adjusted refusal rate for B visas by nationality for FY 2011).
Id.
164.
165.
Cf. Edward Alden et al., Faster,Safer, and Smarter:A Modern Visa System
for the United States, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jan. 2012), http://www.cfr.org/
(noting a
immigration/faster-safer-smarter-modern-visa-system-united-states/p27055
backlog in visa adjudications after September 11, 2001).
See Settlage, supra note 116, at 66-68 (discussing the difficulty of obtaining
166.
nonimmigrant visas post-9/11).
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applicants, effectively driving less elite applicants into the hands of
smugglersl 6 7 if such applicants are able to flee at all.
3.

Assessment of the Current System

Ultimately, the purposes of visa controls have no connection to
the purposes of refugee law, 168 and yet the U.S. asylum system
depends on these controls to regulate access to asylum. 169 Visa
controls serve to control the type of migrants who enter so that they
are temporary, self-sufficient visitors, some of whom possess
exceptional skills or educational potential. 170 Refugee law seeks to
extend protection to those at risk -of persecution on account of a
protected characteristic.17 1
U.S. asylum law, in particular, began formally as a residual
humanitarian benefit for those within or at U.S. borders,172 but it has
become an important system of protection. 173 Nonetheless,
nonhumanitarian interests continue to dominate asylum because of
the method by which the law regulates access.174 The visa system
precludes applicants from traveling to the United States openly for
the purpose of applying for asylum, instead driving them to hire
human smugglers, to obtain fraudulent documents, or to lie at their
consulate interviews. 175 This system of access conveys to asylum
seekers that the purpose of the system is not providing humanitarian
protection but testing applicants' abilities to navigate a bureaucratic
maze. 176 Without widespread legal aid services for individuals
applying for asylum, the system remains a mystery, and applicants

167.
See ECRE Interview with Susanne Bolz, supra note 14 (asserting that
asylum visas reduce asylum seekers' reliance on smugglers).
168.
See MARTIN ET AL., supra note 17, at 774 ("The basic U.S. visa system grew
up for reasons having nothing to do with asylum . . . .").
169.
Cf. Hathaway & Neve, supra note 13, at 120 (discussing asylum states' use
of visa requirements to limit access to asylum).
170.
See Cox & Posner, supra note 148, at 825 (describing the ex ante screening
of noncitizens under U.S. immigration law).
171.
See Refugee Convention, supra note 23 (defining refugee under the
Convention).
172.
See Martin, supra note 32, at 1260 (tracing the development of asylum
legislation in the United States); see also Robinson & Frelick, supra note 44, at 293
(noting that the U.S. asylum provision was created "[a]lmost as an afterthought").
173.
See Robinson & Frelick, supra note 44, at 294-95 (noting that initial
estimates predicted around five thousand asylum requests annually but that actual
applications soon exceeded thirty thousand).
174.
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(A)-(V) (2012) (nonimmigrant visa categories,
none of which relate to asylum).
175.
See HATHAWAY, supra note 27, at 292 (describing how visa requirements
are used by multiple countries to prevent applications for refugee status by migrants).
176.
See generally DAVID NGARURI KENNEY & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ASYLUM
DENIED: A REFUGEE'S STRUGGLE FOR SAFETY IN AMERICA (2008) (describing the
odyssey of a refugee who was denied asylum).
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may believe that adjudicators will recognize only the most egregious
claims, leading to unnecessary embellishment.1 7 7
As previously noted, the current visa system also filters the type
of asylum seekers who can access the territory and seek protection.1 78
Those who use nonimmigrant visas to gain admission must meet
certain requirements regarding health, wealth, ties abroad, and-in
some cases-education. 7 9 One might argue that these are valid bases
on which to select U.S. refugees,18 0 but this cannot be so. The current
bases of selection have no relationship to the purposes of refugee law.
It is not clear why the law should contain separate criteria for
admission if these criteria do not represent a different basis of
selection.181 Instead, to make the best use of the "scarce resource"1 82
of asylum, U.S. laws should make asylum available to those in the
greatest danger of persecution 8 3 and deter applications from those
who need it less. Asylum seekers facing such acute harm often
require the greatest assistance in fleeing and becoming refugees.184
III. HISTORY OF THE REFUGEE PROTECTION FRAMEWORK
U.S. refugee law is grounded in international refugee law.' 8 5
Neither international nor domestic refugee law recognizes an
individual's right to be granted asylum in a foreign country,186 nor do
they guarantee individuals access to the asylum state's territory in
order to seek asylum.' 8 7 Instead, international and domestic refugee
law recognizes that most asylum seekers will enter the asylum state's

177.
See Suketu Mehta, The Asylum Seeker, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 1, 2011, at
32-37 (describing the context in which asylum seekers increasingly embellish their
applications while illustrating the particular embellishments made by one asylum
seeker on her own application).
178.
Cf. Cox & Posner, supra note 148, at 825 (discussing ex ante screenings of
noncitizens under U.S. law based on "pre-entry credentials, credentials that are
determined in advance and identified at the border").
179.
8 U.S.C. §H 1101 (a)(15)(B), (F), (J) (2012).
180.
Cf. MUSALO, MOORE & BOSWELL supra note 22, at 83 (querying whether
states should "choose among the victims [of persecution] on the basis of ethnic,
religious or ideological affinity") (quoting Michael Walzer).
181.
Cf. Tyson, supra note 94, at 927 ("Congress's humanitarian intent is
implicit in the choice of the 'humanitarian concern' language to describe the standard
for determining admissions allocations.").
182.
Martin, supra note 43, at 36.
183.
See Anker, supra note 21, at 42 (warning of "exaggerat[ing] the
significance" of references to "humanitarian" purposes in the Act but suggesting that
statutory asylum, like nonrefoulement, reflects "some recognition of the special moral
claims of those in our midst seeking U.S. protection").
184.
ECRE Interview with Susanne Bolz, supra note 14, at 3.
185.
MUSALO, MOORE & BOSWELL, supranote 22, at 3.
186.
See generally ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, 2 THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (A. W. Sijthoff 1972).
187.
Id. at 101.
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territory without formal admission. With the Refugee Convention,' 8 8
States Party superimposed international refugee law on existing
migration control systems, revealing their competing interests in
providing humanitarian protection and controlling migration into
their territory.1 89

A. A State's Right to GrantAsylum
International refugee law does not recognize an individual's right
to be granted asylum in a foreign country. 190 The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) recognizes only the "right to
seek and to enjoy, in other countries, asylum from persecution."191 At
a minimum, this principle secures the individual's right of asylum
"vis-a-vis the pursuing [s]tate"-the right to flee the pursuing state
and to seek and enjoy asylum elsewhere.192 But this right imposes no
obligation on states to grant asylum--or even access to the territoryto a refugee.' 93 Atle Grahl-Madsen has explained that the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), in drafting the
UDHR, initially considered recognizing the "right to seek and be
granted, in other countries, asylum." 194 The British delegation,
however, resisted this phrasing, believing that it would effectively
entitle any asylum seeker to admission into any other country of his
or her choosing.19 5 Such a right would tread on states' immigration
laws.1 96 As an alternative, the British delegation proposed replacing
the phrase "be granted" with "to enjoy."' 9 7 Members of the UNCHR
understood plainly that an individual's right to enjoy asylum meant
little without a corresponding right to be granted asylum. 198

188.
Refugee Convention, supra note 23.
189.
See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 13, at 116 ("International refugee law
was established precisely because it was seen to afford states a politically and socially
acceptable way to maximize border control in the face of inevitable involuntary
migration."); see also Anker, supra note 21, at 41 ("[A]sylum will retain a certain
ambiguity, caught as it is in the irresolution of obligation and discretion inherent in
international refugee law.").
190.
GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 186, at 80.
191.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) art. 14 (Dec. 10, 1948).
192.
GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 186, at 79, 101.
193.
Id. at 101.
194.
Id. at 100.
195.
Id. at 100-01 (discussing the objection of Mrs. F. Corbet of the United
Kingdom, specifically her concern that the draft of present Article 14 of the UDHR
"was closely linked to immigration laws, inasmuch as it gave any person ... persecuted
for political or other reasons the right to demand admission into the country of their
choice").
196.
Id. at 100.
197.
Id.
198.
See id. at 101 (discussing the remarks to this effect of Soviet delegate Mr.
Alexei Pavlov); see also GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 50, at 384 ("To have any
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However, the British delegation cared not about the individual'sright
to enjoy asylum; it was concerned with the rights of asylum states to
"enjoy" granting asylum.1 99 The proposed revision would protect 'the
right of every State to offer refuge and to resist all demands for
extradition."' 20 0 By characterizing asylum as a sovereign right of an
asylum state rather than a human right of the individual, the British
delegation advanced the view of asylum as a discretionary institution
compatible with states' complete territorial sovereignty. 201
The territorial sovereignty of the pursuing state generally
prevents an asylum state from providing refuge to an asylum seeker
who has not yet fled. In The Asylum Case, the International Court of
Justice determined that an asylum state's act of protecting an asylum
seeker from the pursuing state's authorities within the pursuing state
constituted "derogation from the territorial sovereignty" of the
pursuing state.20 2 Accordingly, a state generally cannot grant asylum
in an embassy or consulate located in the pursuing state without that
state's consent. 203 This does not preclude individuals from seeking the
physical safety of an embassy. 204 Rather, in Grahl-Madsen's words,
such protection constitutes merely a "tolerated stay," not asylum. 205
An asylum seeker thus resides for a time in a jurisdiction from which
he or she wishes to "separate" himself or herself. 206 For this reason,
"internal asylum" may both produce undesirable diplomatic
consequences for the pursuing and asylum states and present
practical challenges, such as transporting the asylum seeker out of
the pursuing state without obstruction. 207 Accordingly, the asylum
seeker's flight plays a central role in international refugee law:
absent flight from the pursuing state, the asylum state may have only
a limited ability to execute a grant of asylum. 208

meaning, the right to seek asylum implies not only a right to access asylum procedures,
but also to be able to leave one's country in search of protection.").
supra note 186, at 101 (quoting HERSCH
199.
See GRAHL-MADSEN,
LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW (1947)

(quoting the British

delegation)).
200.
Id. (quoting the British delegation). Grahl-Madsen notes that the UDHR
cannot be invoked to resist legitimate demands for extradition, i.e., those in accordance
with a treaty. Id. at 101-02 n.55. More fundamentally, Grahl-Madsen emphasizes that
extradition and asylum are best conceived of as two distinct institutions rather than as
two sides of a single issue, or one as the rule and the other as the exception.
GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 50, at 355.
201.
202.
GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 186, at 45-46 (discussing The Asylum Case).
203.
Id. at 46.
Id.
204.
205.

Id.

206.
Raufer, supra note 41, at 257-58.
207.
See id. ("It is unreasonable to expect that an in-country program which
processes refugees who are in current fear will not be affected by, or affect, the
diplomatic relationship between the countries.").
208.
See GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 186, at 45-46 (discussing diplomatic
asylum).
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WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange's ongoing efforts to flee the
United Kingdom and enjoy asylum in Ecuador demonstrate this
difficulty. 20 9 Sweden seeks to exercise jurisdiction over Assange to try
him for alleged sexual offenses arising out of a trip he took there in
2010.210 Assange fled to the United Kingdom, which then determined
that it was obligated to extradite him to Sweden. 2 11 He then sought
refuge in the Ecuadorian embassy and applied for asylum, hiding for
two months while awaiting a decision.2 12 Ecuador ultimately granted
him "diplomatic asylum" on the ground that he might ultimately be
extradited to the United States and subjected to the death penalty. 213
Nonetheless, the United Kingdom maintained that it was bound to
extradite Assange and that it would arrest him if he attempted to flee
the Ecuadorian embassy to travel to Ecuador. 214 Accordingly,
although Assange has obtained a grant of asylum in a third country,
he has no straightforward way to travel there without the risk of
apprehension and extradition. Asylum has no force where the
individual remains within the territory of the pursuing state and the
latter prevents the individual's flight to the safe haven. 215 As a result,
even an asylum state's right to enjoy granting asylum is
circumscribed by the interests of the pursuing state.

B. An Individual's Right to Seek Asylum
Against this backdrop of territorial sovereignty, however, are the
individual's right to seek asylum and international human rights

209.
See William Neuman & Maggy Ayala, Ecuador Grants Asylum to Assange,
Defying Britain, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/081
17/worldlamericas/ecuador-to-let-assange-stay-in-its-embassy.html?pagewanted=all
("Tensions between Britain and Ecuador had been building over Britain's efforts to
secure a handover of Mr. Assange."); see also Ecuador Restates Support for Assange on
Asylum Anniversary, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/
media/2013/aug/16/ecuador-julian-assange-asylum-anniversary ('Ecuador accepts that
resolving Julian's status and specifically his right to leave the embassy without threat
of arrest and onward extradition to the US involves the jurisdictions of three sovereign
nations - the UK, Sweden and Ecuador."').
210.
Julian Assange Loses Extradition Case, THE GUARDIAN (May 30, 2012),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/medialblog/2012/may/30/julian-assange-extradition-verdictlive-coverage.
See, e.g., Nicolas Watt, UK Tells Ecuador Assange Can't Be Extradited If He
211.
Faces Death Penalty, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 3, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
media/2012/sep/03/ecuador-julian-assange-extradited-death-penalty?newsfeed=true
(observing that Britain was obligated to extradite Assange to Sweden as long as his
human rights would not be violated there).
Neuman & Ayala, supra note 209.
212.
213.
Id.
214.
Id.
See GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 186, at 45-46 (discussing diplomatic
215.
asylum).
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related to free movement. 216 Some have argued that Article 14 of the
UDHR implicitly guarantees individuals a right to access an asylum
procedure by guaranteeing the right to seek asylum. 2 17 Moreover, the
right to seek asylum established in the UDHR continues to evolve in
relation to other international instruments, reflecting developments
in human rights law. 21 8 These instruments reinforce the right of
individuals to flee a country of persecution2 19 and encourage asylum
states to admit refugees for this purpose. 220
The right to emigrate is chief among these rights. 22 1 Article 13.2
of the UDHR establishes that "[e]veryone has the right to leave any
country, including his own, and to return to his country."222 Article 12
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
codifies this guarantee: "Everyone shall be free to leave any country,
including his own." 223 States may, however, restrict this right to
"protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the
rights and freedoms of others." 224 Moreover, the right to emigrate
imposes obligations on the country of origin not to thwart departure
or withhold travel documents, but it does not obligate asylum states
to admit asylum seekers. 225
The Declaration on Territorial Asylum further endorses the
"moral" right of a refugee to gain admission to a country of refuge, 226
but it is neither a binding treaty obligation nor customary
international law. 227 Accordingly, absent greater engagement with

216.
See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 191, at art. 14
(expressing the right to seek asylum); see also International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR Supp. At 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at
art. 12 (Dec. 16, 1966) (guaranteeing the freedom to "leave any country").
217.
THOMAS GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, ACCESS TO ASYLUM: INTERNATIONAL
REFUGEE LAW AND THE GLOBALISATION OF MIGRATION CONTROL 14 n.6 (2011) ("A

closer reading of the drafting history further suggests that while the declaration falls
short of an individual right to be grantedasylum, a procedural right to seek, or in other
words a right to an asylum process, was intended to remain.") (alteration in original).
218.
GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 50, at 383 (observing that asylum
protections overlap with the right to freedom of movement, protected by the ECHR).
219.
Id.
220.

GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 186, at 102.

221.
222.
223.

Id. at 105.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 191, at art. 13.2.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 216, at art.

12.
224.
225.
'complete'
guarantee
226.
227.

GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 50, at 381 (quoting the ICCPR).
See id. at 382 ("The right to leave is not a right which other states need to
through a duty to admit; rather, it is simply a right which each State must
to those within its own territories, as a matter of constitutional principle.").
GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 186, at 108.
Id.
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human rights law, traditional concepts of territorial sovereignty
continue to constrict the right to seek asylum. 2 28
C. Refugee Convention
The central treaty on the rights of refugees, the Refugee
Convention, obligates states not to refouler refugees to countries
where they face persecution. 229 This subpart describes the
nonrefoulement obligation and observes that international refugee
law is not designed to attract asylum claims from abroad based on the
degree of harm suffered by the claimant. Instead, international
refugee law is designed to address the status of people who have
already fled into another country. 230 Accordingly, refugee law does
not obligate asylum states to issue visas to facilitate the travel of
asylum seekers who wish to flee their countries of origin.23 1 Its failure
to do so, however, means that the community of refugees existing in
any asylum state represents not those refugees who necessarily face
the most imminent or severe harm but those who succeeded in
crossing national boundaries and navigating migration controls. 232
This subpart begins by examining the principle of
nonrefoulement generally; next, it explores its purpose in a regime
that expects most asylum seekers to enter asylum states illegally; it
then describes how nonrefoulement applies to visa rules; and, finally,
it discusses the role of nonrefoulement in U.S. law.
1.

Nonrefoulement Generally

Refugee law has evolved since the adoption of the UDHR into a
"hybrid"233 of discretionary asylum and obligatory nonreturn to a
persecuting country. 234 The Refugee Convention is widely regarded as

228.
Cf. Lori A. Nessel, Externalized Borders jand the Invisible Refugee, 40
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 625, 630 (2009) (arguing for interpreting the Refugee
Convention in the context of international human rights law).
Refugee Convention, supra note 23, at art. 33.
229.
See id. at art. 1 (defining refugee as a person who is "outside his country of
230.
nationality" among other requirements).
Noll, Seeking Asylum at Embassies, supra note 16, at 572 (noting that there
231.
is "no implied obligation [on an asylum state] to issue an entry visa flowing from" the
ICCPR).
232.
See Martin, supra note 32, at 1268 ("After all, the only clear requisites for
[filing an application for asylum] are physical presence on the soil of a Western
democracy and persistence in asserting the claim.").
233.
See Anker, supra note 21, at 40-41 ("The best view of asylum is a hybrid,
an intermediary status, partaking of the relatively generous definitional standard of
the overseas refugee program and some of the protection purposes of section 243(h).").
234.
See id. at 41 ("Beyond this, asylum will retain a certain ambiguity, caught
as it is in the irresolution of obligation and discretion inherent in international refugee
law.").

1244

VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 46:1215

the "centerpiece" 235 of international refugee law and an important
humanitarian achievement. 236 The Refugee Convention defines who
is a "refugee" and establishes states' obligations toward refugees. 2 37
However, as scholars have noted, the treaty is far less generous than
it is typically understood to be. 23 8 Although it extends numerous
rights to refugees upon admission and recognition, such as the right
to industrial property,2 39 it does not create a right to asylum and does
not require states to provide asylum seekers with access to the
asylum procedure unless they are inside the territory of the asylum
state or at the frontier. 240 In fact, some scholars characterize the
Refugee Convention as an agreement premised on the right of states
to control migration in the usual ways. 24 1
The central feature of the Refugee Convention is its definition of
refugee:
[A]ny person who ... (2) As a result of events occurring before 1
January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and
is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
242
protection of that country ...

This definition has been widely praised as "nondiscriminatory," 24 3
and it serves as the foundation for modern refugee law. 244

235.
See Refugee Convention, supranote 23, at 2.
236.
See Sadako Ogata, Foreword to THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, 1951 (Paul
Weis ed., 1995), availableat http://www.unhcr.org/4ca34be29.pdf (noting that "[o]ne of
the outstanding achievements of the 20th century in the humanitarian field has been
the establishment of the principle that the refugee problem is a matter of concern to
the international community and must be addressed in the context of international
cooperation and burden-sharing").
237.
See id. ("At the universal level, the most comprehensive legally binding
international instrument defining standards for the treatment of refugees is the United
Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28th July 1951.").
238.
See Martin, supra note 32, at 1255 ("The 1951 Convention, a cautious and
more limited treaty than is often appreciated, provides relatively few actual guarantees
to refugees illegally present in the country of haven (as most asylum seekers now
are).").
239.
Refugee Convention, supra note 23, at art. 14; see also id. at arts. 16-17, 22
(providing refugees with access to courts, the right to wage-earning employment, and
public education, respectively).
supra note 217, at 45 (discussing
See GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN,
240.
nonrefoulement).
See James C. Hathaway, Preface to RECONCEIVING INTERNATIONAL
241.
REFUGEE LAw, at xviii-xix (James C. Hathaway ed., 1997) ("The absence of a duty to
grant permanent residence to refugees was critical to the successful negotiation of the
Convention. While willing to protect refugees against return to persecution, states
demanded the right ultimately to decide which, if any, refugees would be allowed to
resettle in their territories.").
242.
Refugee Convention, supra note 23, at art. 1.
243.
See Anker & Posner, supra note 61, at 60 ("Both House and Senate
sponsors emphasized [in the conference report for the Refugee Act of 1980] that the
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Although not a party to the Refugee Convention, the United
States ratified the 1967 Protocol, and thereby committed not to
return refugees to any country where their life or freedom would be
threatened on account of a protected ground. 24 5 The Senate viewed
the 1967 Protocol as a codification of existing humanitarian
commitments. 246 The 1967 Protocol revised the definition of refugee
by eliminating the requirement that a refugee be displaced due to
events occurring before 1951.247 It also removed the restriction that
these events have occurred in Europe. 248 The 1967 Protocol otherwise
incorporated by reference the key provisions of the Refugee
Convention. 249 As a result, the United States has essentially acceded
to the entire Refugee Convention. 250
At its core, the Refugee Convention offers a limited guarantee
against refoulement to foreign nationals who, having somehow
accessed the territory of the "country of haven," 251 or, on some
interpretations, appeared at the frontier, 252 would face threats to
their life or freedom if returned to their country of origin. 253 Article
33.1 of the Refugee Convention states: "No Contracting State shall
expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to
the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership
25 5
of a particular social group or political opinion."25 4 The emphatic

purpose was to create a nondiscriminatory definition of refugee and to make the United
States law conform to the UN Convention.").
See Refugee Convention, supra note 23, at 2 (referring to the Refugee
244.
Convention as the "centerpiece" of international refugee law).
Martin, supranote 32, at 1259 (noting that ratification of the 1967 Protocol
245.
"was tantamount to acceding to the earlier instrument").
246.
See id. ("An unexamined assumption that U.S. practices conformed fully to
the 1951 Convention's requirements permeated the proceedings, and executive
spokespersons assured the Senate that the 1967 Protocol could be implemented
without changes in the statutes.").
247.
Refugee Convention, supra note 23, at 2 ("[The Convention] has been
subject to only one amendment in the form of a 1967 Protocol, which removed the
geographic and temporal limits of the 1951 Convention.").
248.
Id.
249.
Martin, supra note 32, at 1259.
250.
Id.
251.
See id. at 1255 ("Article 33 [of the Refugee Convention] affords a limited
and country-specific protection" from refoulment).
GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 50, at 208 (observing that a broader
252.
interpretation of nonrefoulement has been established through state practice, as states
regularly allow large numbers of asylum seekers to cross their frontiers).
253.
Refugee Convention, supra note 23, at art. 33.
254.
Id. at art. 33.1. Article 33.2 limits this guarantee: "The benefit of the
present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are
reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he
is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime,
constitutes a danger to the community of that country." Id. at art. 33.2.
See GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, supra note 217, at 53-54, 60 ("[P]rohibiting
255.
non-refoulement 'in any manner whatsoever' would suggest that it applies regardless of
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expression "in any manner whatsoever" belies the restrictive
interpretation of refoulement adopted by some states and the general
disagreement over its scope. 256
2.

Nonrefoulement and "Impunity"257 for Illegal Entry

The Refugee Convention creates no obligations to admit
refugees, nor does it require states to facilitate refugees' flight from
harm. 258 It addresses the plight of refugees who have already fled
their home countries and who have effectuated an entry into an
asylum state. 259 Because asylum states generally do not admit
refugees formally for the purpose of applying for asylum, refugees
must ordinarily enter the asylum state irregularly. 260 Under this
framework, access to asylum is distributed to those who succeed in
evading normal immigration controls. 261 Although flight and
successful entry may reflect a refugee's desperation and his or her
need to escape harm, it may also simply reflect the refugee's ability to
effectuate an entry 262 -his
or her skill in navigating official
paperwork, procuring false documents, or arranging for smuggling. 2 63
Thus, the legal framework for refugee protection is not designed to
extract credible claimants from their home countries, to sort claims
by strength, or to create a priority for claims based on the severity or
imminence of harm.
Not surprisingly, the Refugee Convention expressly contemplates
that refugees will enter asylum states illegally and prohibits states
from penalizing refugees for such entry. 264 Other than a few brief,
nonbinding recommendations that nations provide travel documents
to refugees, 265 the treaty does not candidly address the "controversial

whether actions occur inside the territory of an acting state, at the border, or even
beyond the national territory."); see also GOODWIN-GILL & McADAM, supra note 50, at
385 ("[Rlemoving refugees 'in any manner whatsoever' to territories where they may be
persecuted, whether removal occurs within or outside State territory, will breach
article 33(1).").
256.
See GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, supra note 217, at 17, 68 (noting states'
restrictive interpretations of nonrefoulement and summarizing the debate).
257.
GRAHL-MADSEN, supranote 186, at 209.
258.
GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 50, at 264.
259.
See Martin, supra note 32, at 1255 (highlighting the fact that most asylum
seekers have already fled their home countries).
260.
MARTIN ET AL., supra note 17, at 775.
261.
GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, supra note 217, at 61 (questioning the logic of
maintaining an "interpretation whereby the refugee who manages to elude the border
guard and enter illegally will receive more protection than the refugee who honestly
presents his or her asylum claim to the authorities at or before the border").
262.
Martin, supra note 32, at 1268.
263.
See HATHAWAY, supra note 27, at 292 (noting that, absent an asylum visa,
"only those who lie about their intentions or secure forged documentation are able
successfully to satisfy the inquiries" of those who screen refugees abroad).
264.
Refugee Convention, supra note 23, at art. 31.
265.
Id. at Recommendations (A) (facilitation of refugee travels).
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question of admission."266 Instead, Article 31 establishes "impunity"
267 for illegal entry:
The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their
illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a
territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of
Article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization,
provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and
268
show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.

In failing to impose any substantive or procedural admission
requirements, the Refugee Convention reflects the States Party's
unwillingness to alter existing migration control systems in light of
humanitarian needs. 269
Modern trends have demonstrated states' resolve to minimize
burdens associated with accepting and assimilating refugees. 270
James Hathaway and R. Alexander Neve contend that refugee
protection has evolved from a temporary "human rights remedy"2 71 to
an end run around existing migration procedures leading to
permanent residence.2 7 2 Seeking to avoid the burden of permanently
hosting large numbers of involuntary migrants from the Global
South, states have enacted policies of "non-entr6e. 273 These policies
include a range of deterrent measures, including summary exclusion
procedures, burden-shifting arrangements, interdiction, carrier
sanctions, and restrictive visa regulations. 2 74
3.

Nonrefoulement Applied to Visa Regimes

Visas limit access to asylum because they limit asylum seekers'
access to the asylum state's territory. When countries require
entrants to obtain a visa in order to board a common carrier, but they
do not offer a visa for the purpose of applying for asylum, they deny
asylum seekers "all legal means" of accessing the asylum

266.

GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 50, at 264.

267.

GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 186, at 209.

Refugee Convention, supra note 23, at art. 31.
268.
See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 13, at 117 ("[G]overnments increasingly
269.
believe that a concerted commitment to refugee protection is tantamount to an
abdication of their migration control responsibilities. They see refugee protection as
little more than an uncontrolled back door route to permanent immigration, in conflict
with official efforts to tailor admissions on the basis of economic or other criteria.").
Hathaway, supra note 114, at 41.
270.
See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 13, at 210 (offering a view of refugee law
271.
as a human rights remedy rather than a back door to permanent immigration).
Id.
272.
273.
Hathaway, supra note 114, at 40.
Id.; Hathaway & Neve, supra note 13, at 122 (discussing summary
274.
exclusion procedures and interdiction); see also GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note
50, at 370 (describing "deflection techniques" used by states).
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procedure. 275 Visa regimes may eliminate access to asylum or force
asylum seekers to pursue fraudulent visas or entry through
smuggling or other "illegal migration channels." 276
Ultimately, international institutions accept visa regimes as
legitimate tools of migration control, 277 and no court has interpreted
the decision to grant or deny a visa to access a territory as
refoulement. 278 In the Roma Rights case, for example, British courts
considered the legality of the British pre-entry screening procedure at
the Prague Airport, which targeted asylum seekers of Roma ethnicity
who sought to flee mistreatment in the Czech Republic. 279 The Court
of Appeal determined that the pre-entry procedure violated
international legal principles of nondiscrimination on the basis of
race but that the procedure was lawful under the Refugee
Convention; the House of Lords agreed.28 0 The prescreening program
was consistent with nonrefoulement and not a breach of the duty of
good faith because a state's obligation not to refouler is "triggered
[only] once an asylum seeker is outside his or her country of origin or
habitual residence." 28 1 Accordingly, denying visas to asylum seekers
does not constitute refoulement under the Refugee Convention even if
282
objectionable on other grounds.

275.
GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 50, at 375 ("If external movement is
premised on the acquisition of a visa, and visas for asylum are not forthcoming, then
all legal means of seeking asylum are denied.").
276.
Id. at 374-75.
277.
See GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, supra note 217, at 134 ("In general, however,
granting or denying a visa, even if conducted directly by consular or embassy agents,
has seldom been considered sufficient to constitute refoulement. Merely refusing a visa
does not necessarily provide a sufficient causal link to any future violation of the nonrefoulement principle, and visa controls in general thus seem to have been accepted as
legitimate measures even by UNHCR."). But see HATHAWAY, supra note 27, at 312-13
(discussing the UNHCR's view that visa controls may breach duties under the ICCPR's
guarantees of "freedom of international movement").
278.
See GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, supra note 217, at 133-35 (discussing the
refoulement principle in this context); see also Noll, Seeking Asylum at Embassies,
supra note 16, at 556 ("With regard to embassy applications, one cannot subsume the
rejection of an entry visa under the terms of expulsion, return, refoulement or transfer
to the frontier of territories or to another State or to a country where the specified
threats await an applicant. Accordingly, there is no obligation to provide for a [visa for
the migrant to enter the haven state's territory for the purpose of applying for asylum]
inherent in these norms.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
GOODWIN-GILL & McADAM, supra note 50, at 371 (discussing the Roma
279.
Rights case).
See HATHAWAY, supra note 27, at 308-12 (discussing the Roma Rights
280.
decision).
281.
GOODWIN-GILL & McADAM, supra note 50, at 385.
282.
Noll, Seeking Asylum at Embassies, supra note 16, at 573.
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Emergence of PEPs

Given that international refugee law does not obligate states to
issue visas to refugees to facilitate their journey and admission to the
asylum state, it may be surprising that countries chose to adopt PEPs
at various points in time during the twentieth century. 283 To
understand the rationale for PEPs from the asylum state's
perspective, it is useful to trace the history of the use of passports and
visas for humanitarian ends.
Protective passports and other types of protective papers first
appeared during the infancy of international refugee law. 284 During
World War II, for example, Swedish diplomats initially restricted
entry of Jewish refugees. 285 However, faced with knowledge that
mere "persecution" had morphed into mass atrocities, 286 these
diplomats issued protective papers to a number of Jews in Norway,
287 Denmark,28 8 and Hungary, 289 who otherwise faced deportation to
Holocaust "death camps." 290 Many recipients of protective papers had
only tenuous connections to Sweden, and some had none.29 1 German
and Hungarian authorities honored these papers, albeit
inconsistently, 292 possibly because they had been issued pursuant to
"diplomatic and bureaucratic norms" 293 and provided "physical
evidence of the concern of a foreign power." 294 In Hungary after
German occupation, for example, "[e]veryone understood that the
mere possession of an official looking paper might have some positive
283.
See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONSULTATIONS ON MIGRATION, ASYLUM
AND REFUGEES, ASYLUM PROCEDURES: REPORT ON POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN IGC
PARTICIPATING STATES 2009, at 239 [hereinafter IGC] (describing the Netherlands'
defunct asylum visa and long-standing resettlement program).
284.
See J. Craig Barker, The Function of Diplomatic Missions in Times of
Armed Conflict or Foreign Armed Intervention, 81 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 388, 393 (2012)
(describing the Swedish protective passport or schutzpass during World War II and
noting "little evidence ... that such passes had ever been used before").
285.
See PAUL A. LEVINE, FROM INDIFFERENCE TO ACTIVISM: SWEDISH
DIPLOMACY AND THE HOLOCAUST 1938-1944, at 103 (1996) (noting that, unlike Great
Britain which "opened its doors more than before," "Sweden turned the other way and
tightened its restrictions when the need for refuge grew most acute").
286.
Id. at 130.
287.
See id. at 146 (describing Swedish diplomatic efforts to provide "papers
indicating Swedish interest in" Norwegians at risk).
288.
See id. at 233, 242 (describing Swedish diplomat Gbsta Engzell's cable to
Danish Minister von Dardel that indicated "mere possession of a Swedish document
might induce better treatment [of vulnerable Jews]" and discussed authorization of
"provisional passports" to Danish Jews).
289.
See id. at 267 (discussing the value of Swedish documents in protecting
Jews in Hungary).
290.
Id. at 52.
291.
Id. at 139.
292.
See id. at 268 (explaining how the "various types of document[s] issued by
the Swedes" came to have "relative value[s]").
293.
Id. at 46.
294.
Id. at 267.
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effect." 295 Thus, diplomats continued to issue protective papers when
deemed appropriate, despite their inconsistent effect. 296
Protective documents ranged from the protective passport to an
entry visa to Sweden to two types of protective letters. 297 Swedish
diplomats determined that protective passports had the highest
relative "protective value." 29 8 These passports, known as schutzpass,
were made to look official; through "trial and error" 299 diplomats
determined whether letterhead, stamp, certificate, and signature
affected the impact of these documents.3 0 0 Swedish diplomats were
inundated with requests for help, and they could not assist everyone
who asked. 301 Ultimately, however, they used a combination of
passports, visas, and other papers to protect thousands of Jews from
certain death. 302
Switzerland also issued protective papers during World War II,
and for that reason it may be less surprising that Switzerland
provides the most recent example of a country offering a PEP.30 3 The
Swiss asylum law contained a provision for PEPs as early as 1979.304
When the program existed, Swiss embassies announced the
availability of the PEP visa on their websites.3 0 5 The application for a
PEP visa required applicants to explain, orally or in writing, the basis
of the claim for refugee status. 306 The embassy would then forward
the information to the Federal Office of Migration (FOM), which
screened the application. 3 07 If the application presented sufficient

295.
Id.
296.
Id.
297.
See id. at 268 (examining a memorandum describing the various Swedish
papers).
298.
Id.
299.
Id.
See id. ("[A] document with a signature was worth more than one without it
300.
[...] possession of any document with a Swedish letterhead or stamp was better than
having nothing at all.").
301.
Id. at 269.
302.
See id. at 277 ("Many thousands [of Jews] survived at least partly due to
the heroic efforts of Wallenberg, Anger, Swiss diplomat Charles Lutz and others.").
303.
See Few Humanitarian Visas Granted by Swiss, SwIssINFo.cH (Apr. 25,
2013, 9:11 PM), http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/swiss-news/Few-humanitarianvisas
granted bySwiss.html?cid=35632382 (noting the prior Swiss practice of issuing
asylum visas).
304.

CHRISTOPHER HEIN & MARIA

DE DONATO,

EUROPEAN REFUGEE FUND,

EXPLORING AVENUES FOR PROTECTED ENTRY IN EUROPE 12-13 (Laura Facchi ed., Mar.
2012), available at http://www.fluechtlingshilfe.ch/asylrecht/eu-international/schengendublin-und-die-schweiz/exploring-avenues-for-protected-entry-ineurope/?searchterm=entering.
305.
Visa for People Living in India/Bhutan, FED. DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
http://www.eda.admin.ch/edalen/home/reps/asialvind/refvisinf/visind.html (on file with
the author).
Asylum Applicants from Abroad, At a Border Crossing, or At the Airport,
306.
FED. OFFICE OF MIGRATION, http://www.bfm.admin.chtbfmlen/home/themen/asyll
asylverfahrenlasylgesuchlasylgesuch ausausland.html (on file with the author).
307.
Id.
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merit, FOM would recommend issuing a PEP visa, and the applicant
would be permitted to travel to Switzerland for the purpose of
applying for asylum properly. 308 The procedure also required
applicants to demonstrate some ties to Switzerland to explain why
Switzerland would be the most appropriate destination for
resettlement. 309 Thus, PEP was not equivalent to in-country
processing of asylum claims or the adjudication of asylum claims at
an embassy. A visa through PEP simply authorized the travel and
entry of an asylum seeker with a credible claim.3 10
The Swiss PEP played an important role in helping asylum
seekers facing acute harm to circumvent the barriers erected by nonentrie.3 11 According to an official from the Swiss Refugee Council, a
nongovernmental organization advocating for refugees, the purpose of
PEP was to be able to respond to "very special situations of acute
danger or to help persons out of protracted situations of insecure or
unsafe conditions." 312 This official has also asserted that the PEP visa
benefitted women disproportionately, 313 as women comprised a
greater share of asylum applicants through PEP, at the airport and at
the border, than applicants lodging applications from inside Swiss
territory after overstaying a nonimmigrant visa or entering without
inspection.3 14 The Swiss government, however, maintained that most
PEP applications were unsuccessful and branded the program an
administrative and financial drain. 315 Accordingly, .it began
dismantling PEP in 2011 and fully abolished it in 2012.316 News
reports suggest the government intended to limit asylum claims from
Eritrean conscientious objectors at Swiss embassies.3 1 7 PEP has been
replaced with a "humanitarian visa," available to individuals whose
"life or physical integrity is seriously and concretely under threat in
their homeland."31 8 However, only half a dozen such visas have been
granted to date.3 19

308.

Id.

309.

Id.

310.
Id.
311.
See Hathaway, supra note 114, at 40.
312.
ECRE Interview with Susanne Bolz, supra note 14, at 3.
313.
See id. at 2 ("Statistics show that the rate of women among the persons
allowed entry is higher than among spontaneous arrivals.").
314.
See E-mail from Susanne Bolz to Author (June 14, 2012, 04:34 CET) (on file
with author) (detailing the figures on "special" asylum applications from the Swiss
border and airport procedure from 2010-2011); HEIN & DE DONATO, supra note 304, at
59.
315.
ECRE Interview with Susanne Bolz, supra note 14.
316.
See Geiser, supra note 16 (explaining the process by which the Swiss
government dismantled the PEP program).
317.
Swiss Protests Against Tightening of Asylum Laws, AL ARABIYA NEWS
(June 23, 2012, 9:42 PM), http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/06/23/222323.html.
318.
Few HumanitarianVisas Granted by Swiss, supranote 303.
319.

Id.
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It is also worth noting that Switzerland participates in refugee
resettlement on an ad hoc basis only, 320 and thus, PEP may have
served as its way of contributing to overseas refugee protection.
Participating in refugee resettlement and offering PEPs, however,
were not mutually exclusive. 321 During the heyday of PEPs in
Western Europe, a few countries, such as the Netherlands, did
both. 322
In 2002, six European states offered such protected entry visas
or received asylum applications at their embassies, but three of those
countries abolished those practices shortly thereafter "due to the
adoption of increasingly restrictionist political agendas." 32 3 Today,
such visas are not offered regularly, but they may be available in
exceptional circumstances. 324 As of June 2012, when Switzerland
abolished its PEP, 325 no Western country offers this visa as a matter
of course. 326 The disappearance of PEPs from modern migration
control is a huge loss for the humanitarian objectives of refugee law.

IV. THE ASYLUM VISA
A. Overview
An asylum visa is a visa granted to a foreign national at the
asylum state's embassy in that person's home country, or a third
country, that permits that person to enter the asylum state lawfully
for the purpose of filing an application for asylum. 327 An asylum visa
is designed in part to facilitate access to the asylum procedure for an
individual who seeks to flee his or her country of origin but has not
yet done so. 328 A person who has not yet fled his or her country of

320.
See IGC, supra note 283, at 344 (explaining that "Switzerland does not
have in place an annual resettlement program" but does engage in ad hoc resettlement
activities).
321.
Id. at 239.
322.
Id.
323.
Noll, Seeking Asylum at Embassies, supra note 16, at 542.
324.
See IGC, supra note 283, at 148 (discussing the "informal possibility" of
obtaining a visa in order to enter France to "make a formal application for asylum").
325.
Geiser, supra note 16.
326.
Press Conference, International Press Center, Reaching Europe in Safety:
The Possibility to Seek Asylum Through an Embassy Saved My Life (Mar. 28, 2012),
available at http://www.presscenter.org/en/event/press-conference-reaching-europe-insafety-the-possibility-to-seek-asylum-through-an-embassy-s.
327.
This is also referred to as a "humanitarian visa" by some policymakers. See
LEPOLA, supra note 15, at 5. However, this terminology is not universal; in
Switzerland, for example, the government has implemented a so-called humanitarian
visa as a replacement for PEP. For this reason, this Article uses the term asylum visa
over humanitarianvisa.
See Noll, Seeking Asylum at Embassies, supra note 16, at 543 ("The notion
328.
of Protected Entry Procedures 'is understood to allow a non-national to approach the
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origin is generally ineligible for resettlement. 329 Thus, his or her
remaining options for flight from his or her country of origin are to
obtain a visa for some other purpose, such as tourism or education, or
to embark on a journey to enter without inspection, most likely
through smuggling. The subparts below consider the costs and
benefits of an asylum visa.
B. Benefits
An asylum visa would likely provide the following benefits: (1)
increased access to asylum for nonelite asylum seekers, (2) the ability
to attract asylum seekers with the strongest claims, (3) increased
transparency to applicants and the U.S. government, and (4) cost
savings related to decreased detention of asylum seekers without
travel documents or those with marginal 330 claims.
First, an asylum visa stands to benefit asylum seekers who
currently are unable to obtain nonimmigrant visas to board common
carriers bound for the United States because of their inability to
prove their intent not to immigrate or to satisfy other visa
requirements. These are people who are unable to convince consular
officials of their story (including unskilled liars) or who simply do not
know what to say or how to qualify for a nonimmigrant visa
(including those who are ignorant of the law).3 3' As the failure to
prove nonimmigrant intent is a significant reason why such visas are

potential host state outside its territory with a claim for asylum or other form of
international protection, and to be granted an entry permit in case of a positive
response to that claim, be it preliminary or final."') (quoting EUROPEAN COMM'N,
COMMC'N TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT TOWARDS MORE
ACCESSIBLE, EQUITABLE AND MANAGED ASYLUM SYSTEMS, COM (2003) 315 FINAL (JUNE
3, 2003)).
329.
See The United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) Consultation
& Worldwide ProcessingPriorities,U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS. (Apr. 8,
2013), available at http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e
66f614176543f6dla/?vgnextchannel=385d3e4d77d7321VgnVCM100000082ca6OaRCR
D&vgnextoid=796bOeb38968321OVgnVCM100000082ca6OaRCRD
(noting
that
"[riefugees must generally be outside their country of origin, but [they] can process
some individuals in their home countries if authorized by the President").
330.
Cf. Martin, supra note 32, at 1287 ("When the process cannot reliably sort
the qualified from the unqualified, asylum applicants drawn to the system will include
not only those with a reasonable chance of qualifying but also others whose claims are
marginal or nonexistent.").
331.
By definition, people who do not receive visas are those who were deemed
unqualified by consular officials. All asylum seekers are generally ineligible for
nonimmigrant visas because of their inability to prove that they intend to return home;
if they receive a visa, it is because they led the consulate to believe that they did not
intend to abandon their home country. If they did not receive a visa, it is because they
did not succeed in this effort or failed to qualify for some other reason. They might not
have succeeded because they did not know that they needed to establish nonimmigrant
intent (unaware of requirements) or were simply ineffective in doing so.
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denied, 332 it appears that asylum seekers who are truly desperate to
flee their country of origin may have particular difficulty obtaining
travel documents under the current system. 333 By providing an
alternative lawful status with which to board a common carrier, an
asylum visa would provide access to these applicants as well as to
those who are unable to secure a loan, unable to obtain a scholarship,
or are otherwise less elite and unqualified for existing nonimmigrant
visas. 334 Moreover, an asylum visa would also facilitate claims from
applicants who are less willing or able to lie335 or hire a smuggler. 336
Second, apart from enhancing access for less elite applicants and
applicants less willing or able to lie, an asylum visa would also
enhance access for those with strong claims of asylum based on
imminent risk of severe persecution. Applicants facing the gravest,
most imminent risk often require the most assistance in fleeing
because they have the least time to plan an escape;33 7 creating a
status for traveling that is responsive to their situation will facilitate
applications from individuals facing serious harm. This may
particularly enhance access for women and girls, many of whom may
lack the financial independence or access to loans to hire a smuggler
or obtain guidance in applying for nonimmigrant visas. 338
Admittedly, an asylum visa is unlikely to help a political dissident
who is easily recognized by his or her country of origin and for whom
the very act of applying for any kind of visa would pose a grave
risk.33 9 However, an asylum visa may help an asylum seeker who has
been victimized by his or her family, tribe, or other nongovernmental
entity where the government is unwilling or unable to stop the harm.
Such a person may be completely unknown to his or her home
government. An asylum visa may also help those facing political
332.
Nafziger, supra note 131, at 14; Visa Denials, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvildenials/denials_1361.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2013)
(explaining what the denial of a visa means under 8 U.S.C. § 1184(b)).
333.
See Settlage, supra note 116, at 66 (discussing the difficulty of obtaining
nonimmigrant visas from poorer countries and the lack of visas for the purpose of
seeking protection).
334.
Whether the new visa captures claims from poorer asylum seekers also
depends on whether applicants for the. asylum visa are required to prove that they are
unlikely to become public charges or whether this ground of inadmissibility would be
waived for them. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (2012) (detailing the public charge ground of
inadmissibility).
335.
See supra note 104.
336.
See ECRE Interview with Susanne Bolz, supra note 14, at 2 ("The embassy
procedure contributes also to undermine the activities of unscrupulous human
smugglers that are abusing the desperate situation of refugees.").
337.
See id. at 3 ("It is important to have a legal possibility to access protection
from outside the country to be able to react to very special situations of acute danger or
to help persons out of protracted situations of insecure and unsafe conditions.").
338.
Id. at 1.
339.
See Raufer, supra note 41, at 256 ("The people least likely to be able to
avail themselves to ICP are . .. those who would be recognized by the government as
adversaries.").
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persecution who have fled to a third country but have no hope for
resettlement there.
Third, institutionalizing an asylum visa would enhance
transparency for both applicants and the U.S. government, which, in
turn, could enhance humanitarian outcomes and security. 340 The
applicant would receive an indication of his or her chances of
prevailing on a claim for asylum, and the Swiss experience suggests
that asylum seekers value this information. 341 The preliminary
screening performed in the adjudication of the asylum visa may deter
asylum seekers with marginal 342 claims from making the journey by
alerting them to the likelihood of failure.34 3 And it would facilitate
the journey of applicants with strong claims. 344 Through adjudication
of asylum visas, the United States would also be in a position to
collect more accurate information about the intentions and
characteristics of potential asylum seekers. Higher quality
information about potential entrants could enhance security. 345
Policymakers have suggested that, in this way, an asylum visa might
function as a tool of "externalized border control" that helps both
asylum seekers and the asylum states. 346
Fourth, institutionalizing an asylum visa could save money by
reducing detention costs associated with detaining asylum seekers at
the border who possess no travel papers. 347 Under § 235 of the

See LEPOLA, supra note 15, at 11 (noting that one of the purposes
340.
underlying the Visa Information System (VIS) is to prevent threats to internal
security).
See ECRE Interview with Susanne Bolz, supra note 14, at 2 (describing the
341.
benefit to asylum applicants of learning their chances of success prior to traveling to
Switzerland).
Martin, supra note 32, at 1287.
342.
David A. Martin has suggested that:
343.
Designing policy to discourage the unqualified from even applying for a benefit
is a perfectly legitimate policy objective, particularly when existing statistics
demonstrate that a high percentage of applications lack merit. To the extent
that current measures are meant to encourage self-selection, so that only those
with strong cases bother to leave their home countries, they address an
unimpeachable administrative aim. In design, at least, these restrictive
practices are meant to send a 'general deterrence' message to persons still in
the home country.
Id. at 1290. Here, the denial of an asylum visa would also potentially deter an
applicant from making a journey to the United States and filing an application.
See id. ("To the extent that current measures are meant to encourage self344.
selection, so that only those with strong cases bother to leave their home countries,
they address an unimpeachable administrative aim.").
LEPOLA, supra note 15, at 10 (highlighting the security strength of a
345.
functioning VIS).
Id. This author does not endorse the use of externalized border control but
346.
simply notes that an asylum visa can be cast as a "win-win" tool of externalized border
control. See id.
See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, U.S. DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS: SEEKING
347.
PROTECTION, FINDING PRISON 47 (2009), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/
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Immigration and Nationality Act, the government must place in
expedited removal all foreign nationals, including asylum seekers,
who attempt to enter at the border or a port of entry with fraudulent
documents or no documents. 348 To the extent that an asylum visa
provides appropriate travel papers to an asylum seeker who would
otherwise rely on smuggling or fraudulent documents, the
government would need to spend less on detaining such applicants
because there would be fewer of them.
Finally, any measure that reduces the use of detention will
benefit asylum seekers because detention imposes tremendous costs
on them.34 9 Detained asylum seekers face greater barriers to proving
their claims largely because of their inability to participate in the
development of their case.3 50 An asylum visa would offer many
asylum seekers an alternative to the use of fraudulent documents and
thus diminish one source of prolonged detention for many of them.

C. Costs of Asylum Visa
Instituting an asylum visa may involve the following costs: (1)
the loss of the ability to screen applicants based on certain attractive
characteristics, (2) the inability to assess the strength of claims made
prior to flight from the asylum seeker's home country, (3) damage to
diplomatic relations, (4) danger to applicants, (5) domestic political
disapproval, and (6) costs of increased workload at the consulates. 35 1
First, allowing applicants to enter for the sole purpose of
applying for asylum eliminates barriers that filter for attractive
characteristics: diligence and savvy to procure a visa or hire a
smuggler, wealth or ability to secure a loan, an appetite for risk, and
knowledge of what the consular official needs to hear to grant the
visa. 35 2 Given that the United States cannot (and has no duty) to

wp-content/uploads/pdf/090429-RP-hrf-asylum-detention-report.pdf
(finding that the
U.S. government spent $300 million to detain asylum seekers between March 2003 and
February 2009); see also id. at 49 (discussing the cost savings of using alternatives to
detention).
348.
See Karen Musalo et al., The Expedited Removal Study: Report on the First
Three Years of Implementation of Expedited Removal, 15 NOTRE DAME J. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 1, 3 (2001) (discussing the process of expedited removal due to fraud).
349.
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 347, at 42-45 (discussing the impact of
detention on asylum seekers to include increased incidence of depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, anxiety, a reduced ability to win asylum, and pressure to
abandon asylum claims altogether).
350.
Id.
351.
These considerations are adapted from Susan Raufer's article, which
focuses on self-selection, risk, diplomacy, and the value of flight. See Raufer, supra note
41, at 257-60.
352.
An asylum visa might also encourage those with claims of past persecution
to come forward over those who fear future harm, and this could undermine the
purpose of capturing claims of asylum seekers facing "acute" harm. Raufer's analysis of
the "self-selection" phenomenon in the context of in-country refugee processing is
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absorb all of the world's refugees, 3 5 3 some might defend the current
system for its ability to select for other traits, such as potential for
economic success. 354 Introducing an asylum visa would interfere with
this selection mechanism. However, as discussed extensively in Part
II, the U.S. visa system already heavily, almost exclusively, privileges
those with economically advantageous traits. U.S. asylum law need
not and should not do the same. Instead, it should privilege those
with strong asylum claims based on fear of severe and imminent
persecution.3 55
Second, the absence of flight eliminates an important signal of
the seriousness of the claim. 356 Once an applicant has arrived in the
United States, one can begin to conceive of that person as a refugee as
defined in the Refugee Convention because that person has
successfully fled from his or her country of origin.3 57 If consular
officials are tasked with considering asylum visa applicants as
potential refugees, but without the benefit of those applicants having
fled (already), it could lead consular officials to demand more
information or evidence regarding the strength of the asylum claim
than what would be demanded once the applicant has already fled.3 58
However, the adjudication of an asylum visa can serve simply as a
prescreen of the asylum claim and not a full adjudication of the
claim.3 59 Proper training of consular officials could help address this
issue, but it remains a serious concern.

instructive. Raufer argues that in-country processing programs attract applicants with
claims of past persecution, because claims based on past persecution are, by definition,
based on events that occurred with certainty rather than events that are only likely to
occur. Thus, applicants for asylum based on past persecution have greater confidence
about their likely success in qualifying for protection. In contrast, applicants with
claims based only on future persecution may not risk coming forward if success is
uncertain. Raufer concludes that ICP programs, with their numerical caps, thus divert
precious refugee protection resources to victims of past persecution rather than asylum
seekers facing imminent future threats. Id. at 255. This concern may apply with equal
force to an asylum visa program.
MUSALO, MOORE & BOSWELL, supra note 22, at 80.
353.
See Price, supra note 34, at 450-51 (arguing that the duty to provide
354.
refugee protection is stronger when domestic political support is "greater-than-usual,"
as in the case of refugees who will "impose less of an economic hardship because their
skill profile better complements the national economy").
355.
See Raufer, supra note 41, at 255 (arguing that the primary goal of the U.S.
refugee program should be to provide a "safe alternative" to those facing imminent
persecution); see supraPart II.
356.
See Raufer, supra note 41, at 260-61 (noting that flight "may be a
determining factor in an asylum application").
357.
See Refugee Convention, supra note 23, at art. 1(A)(2) (defining a refugee
as, among other things, "a person who is outside the country of his nationality").
358.
Id.; see also Raufer, supra note 41, at 261 ("[T]he absence of flight in an ICP
application results in a greater burden for the in-country applicant.").
See HEIN & DE DONATO, supra note 304, at 55 (noting that travel
359.
authorization in the form of a protection visa is given if the government seeks to
"clarify the merits and facts of the case").
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Third, an asylum visa could prove diplomatically costly or even
completely infeasible in some countries. Countries that produce
asylum seekers are likely to take offense to a U.S. practice of issuing
visas so that their citizens can advance claims of persecution in the
United States. 360 The very existence of the practice in the home
country's territory and jurisdiction would appear to undermine the
traditional regard for territorial jurisdiction evident in refugee law. 36 '
As embassies operate and issue visas "at the behest of the
government from which the [asylum seekers] wish to separate
themselves," it may not be possible to offer asylum visas in all
countries.362 The prior existence of asylum visa procedures for a
number of European countries suggests, however, that such a
program can be implemented, at least in part, without diplomatic
crisis. 3 63
Fourth, an asylum visa may endanger asylum seekers who
obtain (or even apply for) such a visa by exposing them as
government adversaries. 364 For an asylum seeker who succeeds in
obtaining an asylum visa, the visa amounts to an announcement to
the country of origin, by a stamp in the applicant's passport, that the
applicant desires asylum in the United States and intends to accuse

360.
Cf. Price, supra note 34, at 443 (discussing asylum as a tool to shame or
sanction other nations).
361.
See Raufer, supra note 41, at 257-58 (discussing the diplomatic costs of
adjudicating in-country asylum claims); cf. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 186, at 45 ("A
decision to grant diplomatic asylum involves a derogation from the sovereignty of that
State. It withdraws the offender from the jurisdiction of the territorial State and
constitutes an intervention in matters which are exclusively within the competence of
that State." (quoting The Asylum Case)).
362.
Raufer, supra note 41, at 257. With regard to in-country processing, Raufer
states,
In such a program the United States is placed in the untenable position of
negotiating an ongoing program of release with a government it is accusing of
violating its citizens' rights. When a person comes to the U.S. embassy fleeing
current or potential persecution, a grant of refugee status by the U.S.
necessarily conveys to the home country that the U.S. believes the home
country is currently in violation of its duties to that person, either by actively
persecuting, or by failing to protect the individual.
Id. at 257-58. An asylum visa, however, presents a distinct situation where the United
States would not be adjudicating the claim of refugee status but simply performing a
preliminary screen to expedite and facilitate the individual's flight from the home
country. See also Noll, Seeking Asylum at Embassies, supra note 16, at 552-53.
363.
See ECRE Interview with Susanne Bolz, supra note 14, at 1 (noting the
existence of a Swiss PEP since 1979).
364.
See Raufer, supra note 41, at 256 (discussing the risks asylum seekers
would face by the physical act of coming to the embassy to file a claim for asylum
through an in-country processing program); see also Anker & Posner, supra note 61, at
47 (discussing congressional testimony from a representative of the ACLU stating that
"it would be impossible for a person in a country where he is suffering persecution, to
be pre-cleared, screened or processed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service")
(quoting David Carliner, American Civil Liberties Union).
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the country of origin of persecution or unwillingness, or inability, to
stop persecution. 365 Such concerns could be dealt with through
establishing the asylum visa as a "shadow" visa. It would not need to
openly announce the applicant's intention to apply for asylum but
could be designed to look exactly the same as other common
nonimmigrant visas. Further, it might carry a unique bar code or
other identifying information detectable only by USCIS. These
measures might sufficiently shield asylum seekers' intentions from
the country of origin. However, the country of origin's knowledge of
this practice itself may complicate its execution, as countries that
tolerate or purport to tolerate the issuance of such visas may still
thwart suspected asylum seekers' efforts to flee by, for example,
detaining and questioning suspected asylum seekers at the airport.
Ultimately, the practice of issuing asylum visas would be
impracticable in some countries.
Fifth, the American public is wary of perceived abuse of the
asylum system, and the media have fueled the perception that the
system is filled with and, to a lesser extent, creates incentives to
commit fraud. 366 The domestic political cost of creating an asylum
visa is the popular fear of opening the "floodgates" 367 to asylum
seekers worldwide. Creating a new basis for entering the country
while preserving the old would seem to increase access without any
limit. 368 However, one strategy for combating public disapproval is to
emphasize the way in which an asylum visa provides a more
straightforward path to the U.S. asylum procedure, decreasing the
forced deception at the heart of the current system. Despite the
unequivocal purpose of increasing access, the asylum visa may, in
this way, also serve as an antifraud device.
Ultimately, as noted above, an asylum visa is not a practical
option for many asylum seekers. Applicants for asylum, therefore,
must still be allowed to resort to other means of accessing the asylum
procedure.3 69 If embassies offer asylum visas abroad, however, what

365.
See generally Glenna MacGregor, Human Rights First Concerns about USAsylum
Seekers' Confidentiality and Safety,
VISIT's
Implications for
http://epic.org/privacy/us-visit/hrf-memo.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2013) (discussing the
privacy interests of asylum seekers).
366.
See Mehta, supra note 177, at 32-37.
367.
See Anker & Posner, supra note 61, at 57 (discussing then-Congressman
Dante Fascell's modification of the House committee's amended refugee definition
allowing those still within the country of persecution to "qualify as refugees").
Cf. Hathaway & Neve, supra note 13, at 117-18 (noting that governments
368.
cannot be expected to provide "quality protection to all refugees who arrive at their
territory. The critical right of at-risk people to seek asylum will survive only if the
mechanisms of international refugee protection can be reconceived to minimize conflict
with the legitimate migration control objectives of states . . . .").
Refugee Convention, supra note 23, at art. 31(1) (stating that the
369.
contracting states "shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or
presence, on refugees who . . . enter or are present in their territory without
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will the public, not to mention the courts, make of claims filed by
asylum seekers who entered after obtaining other visas or who were
smuggled in? Will those claims be tainted by an assumption that the
applicant is not credible? If Congress creates a ground for admission
that supports an asylum visa, it will need to address such matters as
well.
Sixth, introducing an asylum visa would undoubtedly impose
new administrative and financial costs on the government. The "pull"
effect of such a visa could be staggering.37 0 Embassies would likely be
flooded with applicants, many of whom would not be asylum seekers
but rather purely economic migrants seeking to qualify for a new
ground for admission. There would undoubtedly be an increase in the
workload for consular officials. Consular officials would be stretched
by the burden of adjudicating these additional visa applications.3 7 1
This would likely require hiring more consular officials and securing
a larger State Department budget. A modest fee for an asylum visa
application could ameliorate the financial burden and deter frivolous
applications, but no system can be designed to preclude fraud
entirely. Careful design, however, might help mitigate these basic
structural concerns. A rational asylum visa provision must contend
with these possibilities.
Lastly, the potentially significant costs associated with deporting
unsuccessful applicants must also be considered.
D. Objections
This subpart addresses additional objections apart from the
"costs" discussed above. First, one might wonder why the United
States should not simply institute in-country processing of asylum
applications or expand the overseas refugee program instead of
instituting a new visa. As explained above, in-country processing
suffers from a number of problems that Susan Raufer has
identified.3 72 In particular, it grants a status that actually has no
effect until the asylee, in this case, leaves his or her home country.37 3
As in the situation faced by Julian Assange, a grant of asylum while
one is still within the country one seeks to flee is particularly

authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and
show good cause for their illegal entry or presence").
370.
I am grateful to Jennifer Rellis for raising this point; see also ECRE
Interview with Susanne Bolz, supra note 14, at 3 (discussing the Swiss government's
fear of the "pull-effect" of the PEP).
371.
See ECRE Interview with Susanne Bolz, supra note 14, at 3 (discussing the
overwhelming workloads of Swiss consular officials).
372.
Raufer, supranote 41, at 253-59.
373.
See GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 187, at 77 (noting that a right to grant incountry asylum is "not recognized" outside Latin America, although states may still
provide temporary refuge to persons in danger).
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ineffective. 374 Would a grant of less protection, a mere visa, help
more? The lessons of World War II suggest yes-modest interventions
often have greater effect than a large scale, public rescue.3 75 For
lesser known figures who are not on the government's radar, but who
still have a well-founded fear of persecution, such a visa is a "quiet"
way of facilitating the asylum seeker's escape without shaming the
country of origin through an outright grant of asylum. 376 For famous
figures, such as Chen Guangchen, nothing short of diplomatic talks is
likely to work; an asylum visa may do little to help such a person, but
the current system is no better.3 77
Expanding USRAP is also no substitute for facilitating travel for
asylum seekers in imminent danger of severe persecution. As
discussed in Part II, USRAP is generally unavailable and privileges
political considerations.3 78 Merely expanding that program without
recognizing the unique role of asylum misses the opportunity to make
the most of the U.S. asylum system. One might respond that having
consular officials adjudicate asylum visas reproduces this very
problem by involving the State Department in an adjudication related
to asylum. However, there are advantages to this approach, which are
discussed below.
One might also assert that the asylum visa stops arbitrarily at
the point of providing papers to authorize travel and admission. Why
not cover airfare and other expenses? The neediest asylum seekers,
after all, could very well be destitute and unable to access the asylum
visa for that reason. This Article proposes to draw the line at
providing a visa because, as controversial as such a measure might
be, providing additional support would invite greater controversy.3 79
The many decades of PEPs in Europe demonstrate that an asylum
visa, however, is not inherently untenable, financially or

374.
See Raufer, supra note 41, at 238 (discussing the anomaly under
international law of a country extending permission to enter while an individual
remains in his or her home country, which is seen as a foreign country inserting "one's
own law between the individual and the laws of the sovereign country"); see also
Ecuador Restates Support for Assange on Asylum Anniversary, THE GUARDIAN (Aug.
16,
2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/aug/16/ecuador-julian-assangeasylum-anniversary (noting that Assange's ability to leave the Ecuadorian embassy
without the threat of extradition implicates the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom,
Sweden, and Ecuador).
375.
LEVINE, supra note 285, at 278.
376.
Cf. Price, supra note 34, at 443 (discussing the "political conception" of
asylum as a "sanction against other states").
377.
Chen
Guancheng,
Timeline, WASH.
POST
(May
2,
2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/world/chen-guangcheng-timeline/.
378.
See supra Part II.
379.
Cf. Martin, supra note 43, at 35 (discussing the public's backlash against
the asylum adjudication system when it is demonstrated to be "dismayingly
ineffective").
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administratively. 380 The political choices that Western European
countries have made to dismantle those programs do not undermine
their potential value elsewhere.3 81
Finally, it is important to consider the wisdom and practicability
of any U.S. measure in the context of other countries' protection
policies. 382 Most asylum states have scaled back humanitarian
protections in recent years and have increasingly adopted deterrence
policies to prevent asylum seekers from entering the asylum state's
territory.3 83 Under what circumstances would it make sense for the
United States to offer more opportunities for protection, especially
given the tremendous existing U.S. resettlement program? Framed
this way, the reason for doing so is unclear, other than outsized
generosity. However, an asylum visa offers the potential of screening
asylum claims at the origin (or near to the origin) for the strength of
the claim, which, as this Article has argued, could potentially lead to
a better allocation of existing U.S. asylum resources to the neediest
claimants rather than simply "more" asylum. Nonetheless, many
scholars and practitioners have rightly acknowledged the need among
states for a collaborative solution to protecting refugees. 384
E. Toward an Ideal Asylum Visa Regime
An ideal asylum visa regime would maximize humanitarian
benefits and minimize fraud. A complete discussion of the details of
an ideal asylum visa regime is beyond the scope of this Article, but a
few observations will be offered in this subpart.
1.

Role of Asylum Visa in Context of Other Visas and Entry
Without Inspection

To maximize humanitarian benefits, an asylum visa provision
should allow applicants to apply for the visa without preclusive effect;

380.
See ECRE Interview with Susanne Bolz, supranote 14, at 1 (noting that the
asylum visa had been available in Switzerland since 1979).
381.
See Noll, Seeking Asylum in Embassies, supra note 16, at 542 (discussing
"restrictionist political agendas" in Northern Europe that led to the dismantling of
PEPs there).
382.
I am grateful to Michael Kagan for raising this point.
383.
See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 13, at 115-16 (noting that "many
countries are withdrawing from the legal duty to provide refugees with the protection
they require").
384.
Id. at 169-70 (discussing a collaborative approach to temporary refugee
protection); ECRE Interview with Susanne Bolz, supra note 14, at 3 ("We believe that
the situation [the pressure to dismantle the PEP] might have been different if
Switzerland had not been one of the very few countries with such a procedure in place
at that time. If refugees had had the opportunity to address other countries as well,
there could have been a more concerted proceeding, to the benefit of the refugees. This
exemplifies just how important it is to look for European solutions. It all boils down to
the issue of shared responsibility.").
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this means they could reapply after some period of time or after a
relevant change in circumstances if unsuccessful on the first
application. Due to U.S. obligations under Article 31 of the Refugee
Convention, and because an asylum visa would not be practicable for
many asylum seekers,3 8 5 those who obtain other nonimmigrant visas
or who enter without inspection should retain the same right to apply
for asylum after entering the United States without any penalty for
having not first obtained an asylum visa. 386
2.

Adjudicators of the Visa Must be Trained in Refugee Law

As in the Swiss PEP, consular officials could send asylum visa
applications to asylum officers to adjudicate. 387 Under the Swiss
program, asylum officers determined the merit of the application and
recommended whether the embassy should issue a visa. 38 8 That
approach has numerous advantages-principally, that it uses the
asylum officer corps' existing expertise in refugee law. 389 The
disadvantage, however, is the potential for delay and extra
administrative burdens in a context where applicants might face
imminent harm. Ultimately, the more effective approach might be to
train consular officials in refugee law and then to utilize their
expertise in visa adjudication and local conditions in the countries
where they work.39 0 USCIS and the State Department should join
forces to train consular officials in refugee law so that they are
competent to adjudicate asylum visas.

385.
See supra note 305.
See Refugee Convention, supra note 23, at art. 31(1) ("The Contracting
386.
States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on
refugees ... provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and
show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.").
Asylum Applicants from Abroad, supra note 306.
387.
Id.
388.
389.
See Nafziger, supra note 131, at 53 (highlighting the expertise of consular
officers).
390.
Id.
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Adjudications Must be Expeditious to Benefit Asylum Seekers
Facing Imminent Harm and Perform Only a Basic Review of the
Claim for Protection

An asylum visa will only help those facing acute harm if consular
officials can adjudicate visa applications quickly.3 91 This will require
sufficient staffing at the consulates and adequate training of consular
officials in refugee law. Applicants for an asylum visa would undergo
screening for admissibility according to general visa guidelines, such
that asylum seekers with certain criminal histories will not be
admitted. 392 Beyond the basic background checks performed by the
State Department, further inquiry into potential bars to eligibility for
asylum would be improper at this stage. Consideration of such issues
would increase the complexity of the analysis and delay decisions.
Moreover, applicants could overcome bars through advocacy once they
have prepared their applications after arrival.39 3
4.

Efficacy

An asylum visa, as described thus far, essentially creates a new
ground for admission that potentially leads to permanent residence.
Such a basis for admission must be used carefully to retain public
support and efficacy abroad. 394 It may not be feasible for Congress to
create an asylum visa in the mold of others as a "normal" basis for
admission. Instead, an asylum visa may work best when used in
exceptional cases of humanitarian crisis. As Paul Levine notes at the
close of his study, Swedish diplomat Gosta Engzell captured the
possibility and limitations of protective passports in a cable to a
fellow diplomat:
Finally I want to touch upon the provisional passports and want to
emphasize that we must be restrictive with them. Everyone wants one
and it would be a debacle if we conceded too much. It is partially chance
who gets them. We don't really know what good they do.... Much is a
question of judgement which is difficult to decide from here. . . . But if
you see in individual cases that such papers can save someone, we of
3 95
course have nothing against your decision.

391.
See LEPOLA, supra note 15, at 22 ("[A] request for a humanitarian visa
should enable the applicant to leave the country as soon as possible.").
392.
Visa Denials, supra note 332 (explaining that an applicant's past or current
criminal actions can make the applicant ineligible for a visa).
393.
A formal visa appeals process for asylum visas would also promote accuracy
and fairness in the adjudication of these applications. I am grateful to Kate
Aschenbrenner for raising this point. Cf. Dobkin, supranote 145, at 120-21 (describing
the dangers of insulating consular decisions from judicial review in light of the effects
of racism and other "malicious factors").
394.
Cf. Mehta, supra note 177.
395.
LEVINE, supra note 285, at 278 (quoting Engzell's cable to a fellow
diplomat).
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Analogously, asylum visas granted too frequently or without careful
consideration may antagonize "refugee-producing" 396 countries or
prompt such countries to thwart visa holders attempting to flee.39 7
The paradox of humanitarian rescue, alluded to by Engzell above, is
that it is most effective when rare. 98 But this does not mean that the
law should not authorize the possibility of rescue.

V. CONCLUSION

By design, the current method of regulating access to the asylum
procedure in the United States screens asylum seekers based on
criteria unrelated to their underlying claim for asylum. The two
current paths to the asylum procedure are smuggling and entry on a
nonimmigrant visa. The former requires asylum seekers to risk great
danger, and the latter requires asylum seekers to prove great wealth
or skill-characteristics unrelated to their need for protection from
persecution. Thus, the law fails to facilitate the admission of
applicants necessarily in greatest need of protection from persecution,
and it fails to deter those whose claims are weaker and who may
ultimately make the long journey for nothing. The United States can
do better to honor its humanitarian aspirations while acknowledging
the practical and political constraints on the system. The first step
may be to explore more fully the idea of an asylum visa.
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